Batter Up: A Look at the Supreme Court\u27s Lineup, Including the Interaction with the New Chief Umpire on the Bench, as Title IX Marks Its Fortieth Anniversary by Heckman, Diane
Marquette Sports Law Review
Volume 22
Issue 2 Spring Article 5
Batter Up: A Look at the Supreme Court's Lineup,
Including the Interaction with the New Chief
Umpire on the Bench, as Title IX Marks Its Fortieth
Anniversary
Diane Heckman
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/sportslaw
Part of the Entertainment and Sports Law Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Diane Heckman, Batter Up: A Look at the Supreme Court's Lineup, Including the Interaction with the New Chief Umpire on the Bench, as
Title IX Marks Its Fortieth Anniversary, 22 Marq. Sports L. Rev. 461 (2012)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/sportslaw/vol22/iss2/5
HECKMAN_FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/2012 1:54 PM 
 
BATTER UP:  
A LOOK AT THE SUPREME COURT’S 
LINEUP, INCLUDING THE INTERACTION 
WITH THE NEW CHIEF UMPIRE ON THE 
BENCH, AS TITLE IX MARKS ITS FORTIETH 
ANNIVERSARY 
DIANE HECKMAN* 
 
 
 
                                                          
* This article is dedicated to the memory of my father, F. Roger Heckman, a champion softball 
pitcher for teams competing in the City of New York.  Attorney in New York and Adjunct Professor 
at Adelphi University, New York.  B.A., cum laude, St. John’s University, New York; J.D., St. John’s 
University School of Law, New York. 
   Author of the following publications exploring Title IX (presented chronologically):  Women & 
Athletics: A Twenty Year Retrospective on Title IX, 9 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 1 (1992); The 
Explosion of Title IX Legal Activity in Intercollegiate Athletics During 1992–93: Defining the “Equal 
Opportunity” Standard, 1994 DETROIT C. L. REV. 953 (1994); On the Eve of Title IX’s 25th 
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Five Years of Gender Equity Involving Educational Athletic Employment Based on Title VII, Title IX 
and the Equal Pay Act, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 429 (2011). 
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We don’t accomplish anything in this world alone, and whatever happens 
is the result of the whole tapestry of one’s life and all the weavings of 
individual threads from one to another that creates something. 
- SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A number of federal civil rights laws were enacted during the latter part of 
the Twentieth Century to prevent sex discrimination, including Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 19721 (Title IX), which prohibits such 
discrimination in educational program and activities that receive federal funds.  
The statute mandates that, “No person in the United States shall, on the basis 
of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance . . . .”2  Thus, in exchange for the receipt of federal 
funding, an educational institution agrees not to engage in discriminatory 
activities as proscribed by the statute, regulations, and case law.3   
One of the most contentious areas during Title IX’s history has been its 
application to athletics programs, specifically involving intercollegiate and 
interscholastic athletic programs.4  Historically, athletic departments were 
                                                          
1.  Discrimination Based on Sex or Blindness, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2011).  Title IX is also 
referred to as the “Patsy Takemoto Mink Equal Opportunity in Education Act,” due to a 2002 
resolution, signed by President George W. Bush.  See H.R.J. Res. 113, 107th Cong. (2002) (honoring 
the former member of the House of Representatives from Hawaii). 
2.  Id. § 1681(a). 
3.  34 C.F.R. § 106.4 (2011) (requiring an assurance of compliance, which was triggered in the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984)).  See Gebser v. Lago 
Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286 (1998) (describing the interaction as amounting 
“essentially to a contract”).  See also Diane Heckman, Is Notice Required in a Title IX Athletics 
Action Not Involving Sexual Harassment?, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 175 (2003) [hereinafter 
Heckman, Is Notice Required?] (focusing on whether the Gebser pre-litigation notice is required in 
routine athletics’ gender equity cases—devoid of any sexual harassment claims, and arguing that it 
would constitute the official policy of the particular educational institutions and thus fall within the 
Court’s exception.  The article first concentrates on purported sexual harassing actions taken by 
educational employees, including athletic employees.  It then addresses the traditional workings of 
academic athletic departments and post-Gebser case law, while also mentioning Title IX’s 
“contractual nature”).  See infra text accompanying notes 166–67 (indicating then Judge John G. 
Roberts’ description of this as a “bargain.”). 
4.  Diane Heckman, New Rules for the Game Mark the 35th Anniversary of Title IX Involving 
Athletic Programs, 234 EDUC. L. REP. 515, 516 (2008) [hereinafter Heckman, New Rules for the 
Game].  See Diane Heckman, The Glass Sneaker: Thirty Years of Victories and Defeats Involving 
Title IX and Sex Discrimination in Athletics, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 551 
(2003) [hereinafter Heckman, The Glass Sneaker] (the article starts out with the wonderful quote 
from renowned author, Pearl S. Buck, “The basic discovery about any people is the discovery of the 
relationship between its men and its women.”  Id. at 551.  It then explores the statute concerning 
physical education classes, interscholastic and intercollegiate student-athletes, athletic scholarships, 
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segregated based on the sex of the students.  Even though the statutory 
language was devoid of any mention of either sports or athletics, the 1975 
Title IX regulations would cover “athletics,”5 and allow for separate male and 
female teams in certain situations,6 and require “equal opportunity” when 
separate athletic programs were provided for male and female student-
athletes.7 
This Article looks at the Supreme Court’s interaction with Title IX over its 
forty-year history, including the activities of the members of the Rehnquist 
Court and the new Roberts Court.  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the first 
female Justice of the Supreme Court, announced her retirement during July 
2005.  This led to President George W. Bush making his first Supreme Court 
nomination of circuit court Judge John G. Roberts, Jr., a relatively new 
member of the District of Columbia Circuit Court, for the prestigious position.  
A mere two months later, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, who had been in 
poor health, died.  This resulted in President Bush altering the nomination of 
Judge Roberts from the Associate Justice position to that of Chief Justice.  The 
Article focuses on testimony from the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee’s 
confirmation hearings addressing the nomination of Judge John G. Roberts, Jr. 
for the position of Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court.  The situation was 
unique in that there has never been such an expansive dialogue concerning a 
Supreme Court nominee over his or her views concerning this gender equity 
statute.  Due to Title IX’s public association with sports, it was fascinating that 
Judge Roberts, in his opening remarks, chose a sports metaphor in describing 
his role as a judge to that of an umpire.8 
During Title IX’s tenure, there have been a number of contested items 
regarding the law’s application.  Pivotal issues concerned the jurisdictional 
aspects of Title IX and the remedies that may be afforded to potential litigants 
                                                                                                                                           
and athletic employment); Diane Heckman, On the Eve of Title IX’s 25th Anniversary: Sex 
Discrimination in the Gym and Classroom, 21 NOVA L. REV. 545 (1997) [hereinafter Heckman, Sex 
Discrimination in the Gym] (this comprehensive article provides a blueprint of the major areas of 
Title IX’s application, including education generally, extracurricular athletic activities, employment 
and sexual harassment); Diane Heckman, Scoreboard: A Concise Chronological Twenty-Five Year 
History of Title IX Involving Interscholastic and Intercollegiate Athletics,7 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 
391 (1997) [hereinafter Heckman, Scoreboard] (accessible article, with mosaic-like entries to glean 
the history of Title IX); Diane Heckman, Women & Athletics: A Twenty Year Retrospective on Title 
IX, 9 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 1 (1992) [hereinafter Heckman, Women & Athletics] (this 
foundation article still stands up and provides a wealth of information about Title IX). 
5.  34 C.F.R. § 106.41. 
6.  Id. § 106.41(b).  
7.  Id. § 106.41(c). 
8.  See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of 
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) [hereinafter 
Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing]; Heckman, New Rules for the Game, supra note 4, at 515. 
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who seek redress for violations of the statute.  Justice Roberts was involved 
with certain landmark Title IX litigation while working as both a government 
and private attorney.9  Part II provides an overview of the Title IX issues that 
the Supreme Court has confronted.  It addresses the Rehnquist Court lineup; 
the substantive Title IX Supreme Court decisions issued; the retirement of the 
center fielder, Justice O’Connor; and the installation of the new players on the 
team, Chief Justice Roberts, Associate Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. and 
Associate Justice Sonya Sotomayor—all former Circuit Court of Appeals 
jurists—and Associate Justice Elena Kagan, the only current member without 
prior experience as a jurist.  Part III investigates the critical issue of what 
remedies may be available for a Title IX claim.  Part IV excavates the 
bellwether issue of what constitutes the receipt of federal funds to engender 
oversight of the statute by educational programs and activities.  Part V looks at 
whether athletic associations are governed by this statute.  Part VI provides a 
postscript.  The Appendix contains a table summarizing the Supreme Court 
opinions that targeted Title IX.  Woven throughout this presentation is an 
examination of Judge Roberts’ remarks presented during his Senate 
confirmation hearings. 
II.  THE JUDICIAL BRANCH: “TAKE ME OUT TO THE BALL GAME”10 
A.  The Rehnquist Lineup 
1972 marked Title IX’s enactment, as well as the commencement of the 
judicial career of William Rehnquist, when President Richard M. Nixon 
nominated him to the Supreme Court as an Associate Justice.  In 1986, 
President Ronald Reagan then selected Justice Rehnquist to be the Chief 
Justice.  The Rehnquist Court featured: Chief Justice Rehnquist, and according 
to seniority, Associate Justices John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O’Connor, 
Antonin Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Clarence Thomas, 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Steven Breyer.  Despite being on the bench for over 
thirty years, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not author any of the Title IX 
majority opinions.  The time of the burgeoning awareness of Title IX also 
coincided with the tenure of Justice O’Connor, the first female Justice on the 
U.S. Supreme Court (September 22, 1981–January 31, 2006).11  Justice 
                                                          
9.  As an attorney, Mr. Roberts successfully represented the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (NCAA) in the Title IX appeal before the Supreme Court in NCAA v. Smith, 525 U.S. 
459 (1999) (discussed within).  See infra text accompanying notes 166–67, concerning the nominee’s 
description of the case. 
10.  JACK NORWORTH & ALBERT VON TILZER, Take Me Out to the Ball Game (1908). 
11.  O’Connor became an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court coinciding with the 1981 term 
through January 2006, when her successor was sworn in as a member of the Court. 
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O’Connor authored the most Title IX opinions rendered by the Court—three12 
of the eight Title IX challenges13—and from a Title IX perspective, was 
literally the keeper of the flame.  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (August 3, 
1993–present) authored one opinion.14  Thus, the two female jurists accounted 
for fifty percent of the governing Title IX opinions.15  President George H.W. 
Bush nominated Clarence Thomas to fill the vacancy caused by the retirement 
of Justice Thurgood Marshall.  Justice Thomas was a former head of the 
Office for Civil Rights (OCR), a division within the U.S. Department of 
Education that handles oversight of a number of civil rights statutes that 
impact upon education, including administratively overseeing Title IX sex 
discrimination concerns.  His nomination to the Court would be stung by 
claims of purported inappropriate actions toward a female employee during his 
government employment.16   
                                                          
12.  See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005); Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. 
of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (examining Title IX peer sexual harassment); Gebser, 524 U.S. 274 
(examining Title IX teacher-student sexual harassment). 
13.  See Jackson, 544 U.S. 167; Davis, 526 U.S. 629; Gebser, 524 U.S. 274.  See also Smith, 525 
U.S. 459; Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 (1992); Grove City Coll., 465 U.S. 555 
(1984); N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 
(1979).  See infra Appendix Table 1.  Summary of Pre-Roberts Court’s Title IX decisions. 
14.  Smith, 525 U.S. 459.  See Toni J. Ellington et al., Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Gender 
Discrimination, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 699 (1998). 
15.  Diane Heckman, Title IX Marks Its 35th Anniversary by Opening the Doors to Single-Sex 
Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, 237 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 3 (2008). 
16.  See Confirmation Hearings on the Nomination of Clarence Thomas to be an Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102nd Cong. 36–40 
(1991) (testimony of Anita Hill); KEVIN MERIDA & MICHAEL A. FLETCHER, SUPREME DISCOMFORT: 
THE DIVIDED SOUL OF CLARENCE THOMAS (2007) [hereinafter SUPREME DISCOMFORT]; Adam 
Cohen, The Next Big Thing in Law? The Harsh Jurisprudence of Justice Thomas, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 
2007, § 4, at 13.  
In the last 100 Supreme Court arguments, Clarence Thomas has not uttered a word. . . . 
They offer a wealth of insight, but they have no answer to the central enigma he poses: 
why the justice who has faced the greatest hardships regularly rules for the powerful over 
the weak, and has a legal philosophy notable for its indifference to suffering.   
Id.  (referring to SUPREME DISCOMFORT, the 2007 biography on Justice Thomas).  See also JEFFREY 
TOOBIN, THE NINE:  INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT (2007) (focusing 
principally on the actions of the Rehnquist Court) (“Thomas’s confirmation hearings, of course, 
turned into a . . . carnival of accusation and counterclaim between the nominee and his one-time aide 
Anita Hill.”  Id. at 21.   
Hill had been a young lawyer on Thomas’s staff, first at the Department of Education and 
then at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.  During those years, she had 
confided to friends that her boss had made a series of bizarre sexual comments and 
overtures to her. . . . Thomas rejected Hill’s allegations of mistreatment, but otherwise 
refused to answer any questions about his relationship with Hill or his personal life.  
Id. at 27). 
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Chief Justice Rehnquist ushered in the Rehnquist Revolution, finding that 
a number of congressional statutes were unconstitutional acts of usurpation by 
the legislative branch, by transgressing initially the Commerce Clause,17 
followed by infringement of the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution.18  This amendment embedded the principle of federalism, and 
specifically, the rights of the states to be free from having to defend 
themselves in federal courts concerning allegations of violating federal statutes 
in a lawsuit brought by citizens.  Whether an individual can sue a state or arm 
of a state in federal court, without transgressing the Eleventh Amendment, is 
an issue that has come to the forefront in all federal civil-rights-based 
litigation.19  This would include Title IX, as the statute can apply to state 
colleges and universities, as well as public elementary and secondary 
schools—leaving these educational institutions potentially targeted.  Thus, 
“[t]he stance by the recent two Supreme Court nominees on the power of 
Congress . . . vis-à-vis the Eleventh Amendment was a topic of intense interest 
by the Senators on the Judiciary Committee, who interviewed then Judges . . . 
Roberts and . . . Alito.”20 
After switching the original nomination of Judge Roberts to fill Justice 
O’Connor’s seat to that of Chief Justice, President Bush then nominated Judge 
Alito, from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, for her position.  This occurred 
during the end of 2005, after President Bush’s counsel, Harriet E. Miers, 
withdrew her name from consideration for the position.  Justice Alito was 
sworn in on January 31, 2006, and attended President Bush’s 2006 State of the 
Union address that evening at the Capitol building.  When the senators on the 
Judiciary Committee questioned then-Judge Alito, their concerns with him did 
                                                          
17.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States, and with the Indian Tribes”). 
18.  U.S. CONST. amend. XI. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (Supreme 
Court, in a divided opinion, found the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34, 
did not abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity to allow state employees to commence private 
lawsuits in federal courts seeking remedies against certain state entities, including the Alabama State 
University and Florida State University, based on the federal law); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549, 567–68 (1995).   
19.  See generally Diane Heckman, The Impact of the Eleventh Amendment on the Civil Rights of 
Disabled Educational Employees, Students and Student-Athletes, 227 EDUC. L. REP. 19 (2008) 
[hereinafter Heckman, The Impact of the Eleventh Amendment].  While a case-by-case inquiry must 
be made in general, state universities are deemed “arms of the State” to come under the Eleventh 
Amendment definition; whereas K–12 public schools are not deemed “arms of the State.”  Id. at 29–
33 (discussing whether defendants would be cocooned). 
20.  Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an Associate Justice 
of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. 388–89 (2006) [hereinafter Alito’s Confirmation Hearing].  See infra text accompanying note 
161 (presenting a portion of the transcript); Heckman, The Impact of the Eleventh Amendment, supra 
note 19, at 26.  See also Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8.   
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not target Title IX case law.21  There were no changes to the composition of 
the members of the Judiciary Committee, who conducted the January 2006 
Alito Confirmation Hearing, since its earlier inquest of Judge Roberts. 
Title IX allows litigants to bring private causes of action against public 
educational institutions.  Although Title IX was purportedly enacted pursuant 
to the Spending Powers,22 on October 21, 1986, Congress enacted the Civil 
Rights Remedies Equalization Act (Equalization Act), which specifically 
directs, “[a] State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation 
of . . . [T]itle IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 . . . .” 23  The 
Equalization Act has presently provided armor to protect Title IX from judicial 
cannibalism concerning the Eleventh Amendment.24  Thus, Title IX has not 
been hampered from a Supreme Court ruling insulating public schools,25 with 
the Court substantively interpreting the statute in three recent post-Seminole 
Tribe cases,26 with one passing reference to the Eleventh Amendment.27  
Albeit, all of the Title IX cases were brought against public school districts, 
                                                          
21.  Id.; Adam Liptak, The Roberts Court: The Most Conservative Court in Decades, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 25, 2010, at 1, 18 (indicating “But only one change—Justice Alito’s replacement of 
Justice O’Connor—really mattered.  That move defines the Roberts court.”) [hereinafter Liptak, The 
Most Conservative Court in Decades].  See infra text accompanying notes 161–62. 
22.  See Heckman, Is Notice Required?, supra note 3, at 192 (referencing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 
287).  See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75 (1992) (“Moreover, the notion that Spending Clause statutes do 
not authorize monetary awards for intentional violations is belied by the unanimous holding in 
Darrone.”  (referring to Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984))). The 
accompanying footnote alerted, “Because we conclude that a money damages remedy is available 
under Title IX for an intentional violation irrespective of the constitutional source of Congress’ power 
to enact the statute, we need not decide which power Congress utilized in enacting Title IX.”  Id. at 75 
n.8).   
23.  42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) (2011).   
24.  Albeit, the Supreme Court has determined that this express provision within or attached to a 
specific piece of federal legislation will no longer solely equate with constituting a satisfactory legal 
abrogation.  The federal statute must now have an appropriate Fourteenth Amendment nexus.  See 
Heckman, The Impact of the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 19, at 27. 
25.  Earlier, in Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, the Puerto Rico district court ruled that the 
state university was insulated from a Title IX monetary damages claim in a sexual harassment case 
brought by a female medical student and employee, but not from her claim for injunctive relief. 745 
F. Supp. 793 (D.P.R. 1990), rev’d, 864 F.2d 881, 899 (1st Cir. 1988).  See also Litman v. George 
Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544, 552 (4th Cir. 1999) (proffering, “As a general proposition, therefore, 
when Congress acts pursuant to its spending power, there is no categorical prohibition against its 
attaching conditions to grants made to the states.”), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1181 (2000); Franks v. Ky. 
Sch. for the Deaf, 142 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 1998) (concerning a sexual harassment claim brought by 
female student).  See Diane Heckman, Title IX Tapestry:  Threshold and Procedural Issues, 153 
EDUC. L. REP.  849, 856–57 n.61, 858–59 (2001) [hereinafter Heckman, Title IX Tapestry] (listing 
and discussing other cases). 
26.  See Jackson, 544 U.S. 167; Davis, 526 U.S. 629; Gebser, 524 U.S. 274. 
27.  See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284. 
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traditionally not deemed arms of the state for Eleventh Amendment 
application, as opposed to state universities.  The federal courts are allowing 
such federal litigation to take place for those seeking Title IX redress 
(including monetary damages)—finding that the receipt of the federal funds 
provides the implicit waiver of the Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity 
protection.28  In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, the Supreme 
Court, in allowing for all traditional remedies when pursuing a Title IX cause 
of action, stated:  
Our reading of the two amendments to Title IX enacted after 
Cannon leads us to conclude that Congress did not intend to 
limit the remedies available in a suit brought under Title IX.  
In the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, . . . 42 U.S.C. 
§2000d-7, Congress abrogated the States’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity under Title IX, Title VI, § 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Age Discrimination Act of 
1975. . . .  In addition to the Rehabilitation Act Amendments 
of 1986, Congress also enacted the Civil Rights Restoration 
Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 [(1988)].  Without 
in any way altering the existing rights of action and the 
corresponding remedies permissible under Title IX, Title VI, 
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Age Discrimination 
Act, Congress broadened the coverage of these 
antidiscrimination provisions in this legislation.29 
Presently, no defendants have successfully asserted the Eleventh 
Amendment to shield them from Title IX lawsuits.  Currently, “[i]t remains to 
be seen whether the Roberts Court will maintain the status quo exhibited by 
his predecessor and mentor, Chief Justice Rehnquist, or move in another 
direction concerning Congress’s legislative authority.”30 
                                                          
28.  See, e.g., Delgado v. Stegall, 367 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2004) (sexual harassment claim by 
female student against male professor); Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(addressing an intercollegiate athletics sports teams offered to female students); Litman, 186 F.3d 544 
(expelled female student unsuccessfully charged retaliation for advancing unsubstantiated sexual 
harassment against a male professor; the case discussed Title IX’s abrogation of Eleventh 
Amendment immunity). 
29.  503 U.S. at 72–73. 
30.  Heckman, The Impact of the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 19, at 26.  See also William E. 
Thro, An Essay: The Roberts Court at Dawn: Clarity, Humility, and the Future of Education Law, 
222 EDUC. L. REP. 491, 491–92 (2007), noting the differences between the Rehnquist Court and the 
newer Roberts Court, id. at 491–92, and opining, “Consequently, the Roberts Court practices judicial 
restraint.  In place of ambiguous decisions that reflect a middle course but provide little guidance, the 
Roberts Court provides a clarity that provides needed guidance and, ultimately, limits the judicial 
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B.  Title IX Pre-Roberts Supreme Court Decisions 
Title IX was enacted on June 23, 1972.  In the intervening forty years, the 
Supreme Court has rendered eight substantive decisions concerning Title IX.  
Table I of the Appendix contains a summary of each opinion to provide a 
context for the new Roberts Court. 
1.  In Cannon v. University of Chicago, the Court ruled a student was 
entitled to assert a private cause of action alleging Title IX.  Specifically, a 
female medical student commenced this lawsuit concerning her expulsion 
from the medical school, which she alleged was due to her sex.31  The statute 
was silent on this significant aspect.32  This decision set the stage for plaintiffs 
to pursue relief for purported sex discrimination through the courts, rather than 
having to rely primarily on administrative hearings handled by the OCR. 
2.  In North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 33 the Court upheld the 
                                                                                                                                           
power of the lower courts.”  Id. at 492.  But see Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs.. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 
551 U.S. 701 (2007) (Fourteenth Amendment case concerning use of race), where the author 
recognizes the numerous opinions rendered by the Justices, stating, “there is some confusion 
regarding what is and is not the Court’s ruling.”  Thro, supra note 30, at 493 n.16.  The same criticism 
could be made concerning the Roberts Court’s output in Morse v. Frederick, with its myriad decisions 
concerning First Amendment free speech rights of public school students who express verbiage for 
the illegal use of drugs, which was de jure extrapolated from the high school senior’s unfurled banner, 
with the words, “Bong Hits 4 Jesus.”  551 U.S. 393 (2007).  Thro argues the Morse case “does 
provide a bright-line rule in a small, but important, area.”  Thro, supra note 30, at 497.  It remains to 
be seen whether the Morse opinion will result in expanded restriction of students’ free speech rights 
when also speaking out about other illegal activities, without a political or advocacy patina.  See, e.g., 
Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765 (5th Cir. 2007) (dealing with First Amendment 
student free speech case involving a putative threat of a Columbine-type of violence at his school, 
which relied on a concurrence rendered by Justice Alito from the Morse case).  See Diane Heckman, 
Just Kidding: K-12 Students, Threats and First Amendment Freedom of Speech Protection, 259 
EDUC. L. REP. 381, 400 (2010) (discussing the Ponce case in depth).   
31.  Cannon, 441 U.S. 677.  See Cobb v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 487 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1053 (D. 
Minn. 2007) (expounding upon the Cannon opinion, as to whether Title IX allows a private cause of 
action against the U.S. Department of Education, and determining that, “In fact, the Supreme Court 
did acknowledge that private lawsuits against federal funding agencies had previously been allowed 
under Title VI and explained that such cases ‘are . . . consistent, at least, with the widely accepted 
assumption that Title VI creates a private cause of action.’”  This court indicated, “There is no 
binding precedent deciding whether a private right of action against a federal funding agency exists 
under Title IX.”  Id.  The court ultimately determined “that a private right of action against federal 
funding agencies exists when the funding agency itself is accused of acting to violate Title IX and 
foster discrimination.”  Id. at 1054). 
32.  20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88. 
33.  N. Haven Bd. of Educ., 456 U.S. 512.  See Diane Heckman, Jackson v. Birmingham Board 
of Education:  Supreme Court to Review Whether There is a Title IX Cause of Action by an Athletic 
Department Employee for Retaliation, 194 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 4–5 (2005) [hereinafter Heckman, 
Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education] (The commentary informed, “Whether Title VII trumps 
Title IX in employment-related sex discrimination cases remains a significant issue owing to the 
favorable aspects of Title IX compared with Title VII.”  Id. at 5 (referring to Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e [hereinafter Title VII]).  The article concludes, “To leave a 
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constitutionality of the Title IX regulations governing employment (Subpart 
E),34 brought by a public school board against the Secretary of the U.S. 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the predecessor agency of the 
U.S. Department of Education, which came into existence in 1980.  After the 
expansive Title IX regulations were enacted in 1975,35 Congress had an 
opportunity to reject their adoption, but neglected to do so.  In a subsequent 
opinion, the Court would later comment, “Congress’ failure to disapprove the 
[Title IX] regulations is not dispositive, but, as we recognized in North 
Haven . . ., it strongly implies that the regulations accurately reflect 
congressional intent.”36  Presently, the Supreme Court has never invalidated 
any of the Title IX regulations. 
3.  In Grove City College v. Bell,37 the divided Court imposed a narrow 
determination adopting that the specific program or activity must receive 
federal funds in order for Title IX to apply.38  In this case, there was no 
evidence of any gender discrimination at this private, independent 
Pennsylvania college.  Instead, the college refused to enter into a written 
“Assurance of Compliance,” as warranted by the regulations.39  While the 
college itself received no direct federal funding, some of its students received 
Basic Education Opportunity Grant (BEOG) awards, federal money that went 
                                                                                                                                           
coach unprotected from asserting a Title IX retaliation claim seems antithetical to the purpose and 
spirit of the law.”  Heckman, Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, supra, at 33.  The Supreme 
Court essentially agreed in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 544 U.S. 167 (2005)). 
34.  See 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.51–106.61. 
35.  34 C.F.R. pt. 106 (1975).  See Heckman, Women & Athletics, supra note 4, at 12–13. 
36.  Grove City Coll., 465 U.S. at 568. 
37.  Id. at 555.  There were multiple opinions filed, including a separate concurrence issued by 
Justice Powell, Chief Justice Burger and Justice O’Connor.  Id. at 576.  The latter opinion agreed with 
the holding, but did so  
reluctantly and [was written] briefly to record my view that the case is an unedifying 
example of overzealousness on the part of the Federal Government. . . . It was and is the 
policy of this small college to remain wholly independent of government assistance, 
recognizing—as this case well illustrates—that with acceptance of such assistance one 
surrenders a certain measure of the freedom that Americans always have cherished. . . . 
One would have thought that the Department [of Education], confronted as it is with cases 
of national importance that involve actual discrimination, would have respected the 
independence and admirable record of this College. 
Id. at 576–77.   
The Court rejected the institution-wide coverage argument.  Id. at 573.  See Heckman, Women & 
Athletics, supra note 4, at 30–31. 
38.  20 U.S.C. § 1681. 
39.  34 C.F.R. § 106.4.  “When Grove City persisted in refusing to execute an Assurance, the 
Department [of Education] initiated proceedings to declare the College and its students ineligible to 
receive [Basic Educational Opportunity Grants].”  Grove City Coll., 465 U.S. at 561.  
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toward the students’ tuition at the universities and colleges.  The Court stated, 
“[w]e conclude, therefore, that the Department [of Education] may properly 
condition federal financial assistance on the recipient’s assurance that it will 
conduct the aided program or activity in accordance with Title IX and the 
applicable regulations.”40  Even though armed with that determination, 
however, the practical effect of this case was that the Court’s ruling extended 
Title IX’s application merely to the college’s financial affairs office, which 
actually received the funding for athletic and academic scholarships and grants 
as this was the only department within the college that directly received 
federal funds.  There was no trickle out or leakage effect imposed by the 
country’s highest court based on the contention: that simply because an 
educational institution received federal funds, this would subject the whole 
school and by implication all of its parts to comply with Title IX dictates.  
Congress disagreed with this cramped judicial interpretation that had been 
sanctioned by the Reagan administration.  Four years later, President Ronald 
Reagan vetoed the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 (1988 Amendments) 
(Restoration Act), intended to repair the damage done by the Court’s decision, 
by utilizing a broad definition for what constituted an educational program or 
activity. 41  However, on March 22, 1988, Congress legislatively overturned 
the Court’s opinion, after overriding the presidential veto.  The Restoration 
Act would be the only major change to the statute in the intervening forty 
years.  Its impact was significant as it opened the doors for litigants to ensure 
that extracurricular athletic programs provide equal opportunity, especially for 
female students and prospective female student-athletes.42 
4.  During 1992, in Franklin,43 the Court sanctioned a damages remedy for 
                                                          
40.  Id. at 575.    
41.  20 U.S.C. § 1687, Pub. L. 100–259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) states: 
For the purposes of this title, the term “program or activity” and “program” mean all of 
the operations of . . . a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public 
system of higher education; or . . . a local educational agency . . . system of vocational 
education, or other school system . . . except that such term does not include any operation 
of an entity which is controlled by a religious organization if the application of section 
901 [20 U.S.C. § 1681] to such operation would not be consistent with the religious tenets 
of such organization. 
President Reagan, in a speech given on March 22, 1988, stated, “The Grove City bill would force 
court-ordered social engineers into every corner of American society.  I won’t cave to the 
demagoguery of those who cloak a big government power grab in the mantle of civil rights.”  EQUAL 
PLAY: TITLE IX AND SOCIAL CHANGE 102 (Nancy Hogshead-Makar & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 2007) 
[hereinafter EQUAL PLAY].  The prognostication has failed to materialize in the intervening period. 
42.  See Diane Heckman, The Explosion of Title IX Legal Activity in Intercollegiate Athletics 
During 1992–93:  Defining the “Equal Opportunity” Standard, 1994 DETROIT C. L. REV. 953 
(1994). 
43.  Franklin, 503 U.S. 60 (Justice White authored the opinion, joined in Justices Blackmun, 
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a Title IX sexual harassment action involving a “female student . . . against the 
school board for the action of a male teacher, who was incidentally a coach of 
one of the boys’ [interscholastic athletic] teams.”44  The Court described the 
school employee as “a sports coach and teacher.”45  The Court, in adopting a 
broad view of the statute, stated, “[w]e cannot say, therefore, that Congress 
has limited the remedies available to a complainant in a suit brought under 
Title IX.”46  The decision was instrumental in utilizing this civil rights statute 
to ensure eradication of sex discrimination within the schoolhouse doors, 
especially sexual harassment claims.  
5.  On June 22, 1998, the Court rendered its opinion in Gebser v. Lago 
Vista Independent School District, involving a female high school freshman 
student’s claim of sexual harassment against a Texas public school district, 
based on the actions of a fifty-year-old male teacher.47  The highest court 
agreed to hear an appeal from the Fifth Circuit concerning what standard, if 
any, should be applied to determine the Title IX liability of an educational 
institution involving the alleged harassing actions of a (male) teacher toward a 
(female) student.  The Title IX statute and implementing regulations,48 as well 
as the earlier Franklin decision, shed no verbiage on what standard should be 
applied—thus, leading to the use of dissimilar standards by the lower courts, 
including a strict liability standard, an agency standard, a Title VI standard and 
a Title VII hostile environment standard—so the issue was clearly ripe for 
review.49  The Court determined “that damages may not be recovered in those 
circumstances unless an official of the school district who at a minimum has 
authority to institute corrective measures on the district’s behalf has actual 
notice of, and is deliberately indifferent to, the teacher’s misconduct.”50   
6.  In NCAA v. Smith, a female graduate student challenged the practices 
                                                                                                                                           
Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy and Souter.  Justice Scalia submitted a concurring opinion, joined in by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Thomas). 
44.  Heckman, Is Notice Required?, supra note 3, at 179.  See also Heckman, Scoreboard, supra 
note 4, at 406. 
45.  Franklin, 503 U.S. at 63. 
46.   Id. at 73. 
47.  Gebser, 524 U.S. 274 (5–4) (The majority consisted of Justices O’Connor (author), Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas; the dissent featured Justices Stevens, 
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer).  See Diane Heckman, Deconstructing Title IX Sexual Harassment 
Matters Involving Students and Student-Athletes in the Post-Davis Era, 206 EDUC. L. REP. 469, 471–
72 (2006) [hereinafter, Heckman, Deconstructing Title IX Sexual Harassment] (discussing the 
opinion in detail); Heckman, Is Notice Required?, supra note 3, at 191–96. 
48.  Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs and Activities Receiving or 
Benefitting from Federal Financial Assistance, 34 C.F.R. pt. 106 (1997). 
49.  See Heckman, Is Notice Required?, supra note 3, at 180–81. 
50.  Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277. 
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of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), the most important 
collegiate athletic association.51  When an athlete transfers from one school to 
another, athletic associations generally impose a one-year transfer rule, 
whereby the athlete would not be able to play for the new school for one year 
following the transfer.  Student-athletes seek to avoid that penalty by seeking 
waivers of the rule.  After a transfer from one college to another, Smith 
wanted to continue to be eligible to play volleyball.  She argued that the 
NCAA granted more waivers for eligibility for males versus female student-
athletes to allow them to validly participate on collegiate athletic teams.  The 
Court found a lack of jurisdiction over the NCAA, as it would not imbue the 
athletic association’s receipt of federal funds, a necessary prima facie element, 
due to the fact that most—if not all—of its member colleges and universities 
were recipients of federal funds.  The Court essentially eschewed a trickle 
down effect to bring an entity within Title IX’s coverage. 
7.  In 1999, the Court rendered its fractured decision in Davis v. Monroe 
County Board of Education,52 finding that Title IX allowed a cause of action 
against a public school district based on peer sexual harassment.53 
8.  In Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, the Court condoned the 
ability of a (male) former coach of a girls’ high school interscholastic 
basketball team to assert his retaliation claim, pursuant to Title IX, for the 
alleged imposition of an adverse employment action against him for speaking 
out about claimed inequities faced by the female student-athletes at the 
Alabama high school where he worked.54  The coach, who was also a teacher, 
started receiving negative evaluations for his coaching after expressing his 
viewpoint as to the inequitable conditions his athletes experienced, and he was 
ultimately removed as coach.  Justice O’Connor noted that the Court agreed to 
hear this appeal to resolve a disagreement among the circuit courts.55  The 
                                                          
51.  Smith, 525 U.S. 459 (Judge Alito did not participate in the underlying Third Circuit opinion).  
See Heckman, The Glass Sneaker, supra note 4, at 569–70. 
52.  Davis, 526 U.S. 629 (5–4) (The majority consisted of Justices O’Connor (author), Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas; the dissent comprised Justices Stevens, 
Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer).  See Heckman, Deconstructing Title IX Sexual Harassment, supra note 
47, at 472–74; Diane Heckman, Tracing the History of Peer Sexual Harassment in Title IX Cases, 
183 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 12–15 (2004) [hereinafter Heckman, Peer Sexual Harassment]; Heckman, Is 
Notice Required?, supra note 3, at 196. 
53.  See Heckman, Peer Sexual Harassment, supra note 52, at 12–15. 
54.  Jackson, 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (5–4) (The majority consisted of Justice O’Connor (author), 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas; the dissent comprised Justices 
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer).  See  Heckman, Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 
supra note 33.  
55.  Jackson, 544 U.S. at 172–73 (citing Lowrey v. Texas A&M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242 (5th 
Cir. 1997) and Preston v. Va. ex rel. New River Cmty. Coll., 31 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 1994)).  See 
Heckman, Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, supra note 33, at 9–12, 14 (discussing the 
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Court underscored that it has allowed Title IX sexual harassment claims 
despite lack of explicit language56 and would also allow retaliation claims 
despite the lack of explicit language in the statute.  Parenthetically, the Title 
IX regulations did refer to retaliation.57  Specifically, the Court enunciated, 
“[r]eporting incidents of discrimination is integral to Title IX enforcement and 
would be discouraged if retaliation against those who report [such retaliation] 
went unpunished.  Indeed, if retaliation were not prohibited, Title IX’s 
enforcement scheme would unravel.”58  Justice O’Connor explained, “Title 
IX’s enforcement scheme also depends on individual reporting because 
individuals and agencies may not bring suit under the statute unless the 
recipient has received ‘actual notice’ of the discrimination.”59  The majority 
adduced, “[m]oreover, teachers and coaches such as [this coach of the girls’ 
basketball team] are often in the best position to vindicate the rights of their 
students because they are better able to identify discrimination and bring it to 
the attention of administrators.”60  The Court held, “[t]he statute is broadly 
worded; it does not require that the victim of the retaliation also be the victim 
of the discrimination that is the subject of the original complaint.  Where the 
retaliation occurs because the complainant speaks out about sex 
discrimination, [the statutory language] ‘on the basis of sex’ . . . is satisfied.”61 
C.  The Legacy of the Center Fielder, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
In profiling the significance of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, 
commentator Jeffrey Toobin ascribed,  
[o]n race, sex, religion, and the power of the federal 
government, the subjects that produced the enduring 
controversies, control of the Court generally belonged to the 
moderate swing justices, first Lewis F. Powell and then 
                                                                                                                                           
Lowrey case; also citing Lamb-Bowman v. Del. State Univ., 39 F. App’x 748 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(unpublished opinion), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1047 (2002); Weaver v. Ohio State Univ., 194 F.3d 
1315 (6th Cir. 1999); Musso v. Univ. of Minn., 105 F.3d 409 (8th Cir. 1997).  The author opined, 
“Coaches are pivotal due to the repository of knowledge they possess about the factors involving their 
student- athletes and how the gender equity offered them compares with that afforded members of 
other teams within a particular school.”), 18–19 (discussing Preston); Diane Heckman, Lowrey v. 
Texas A&M University Systems: Title IX Vis-a-Vis Title VII Sex Discrimination and Retaliation in 
Educational Employment, 124 EDUC. L. REP. 753 (1998).  
56.  Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173. 
57.  34 C.F.R. § 106.71. 
58.  Jackson, 544 U.S. at 180. 
59.  Id. at 181. 
60.  Id.  
61.  Id. at 179. 
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Sandra Day O’Connor, who steered the Court in line with 
their own cautious instincts—which were remarkably similar 
to those of the American people.62   
He summarized the role of Justice O’Connor, noting: 
[t]hese decisions—the legacy of the Rehnquist Court—came 
about largely because for O’Connor there was little difference 
between a judicial and a political philosophy.  She had an 
uncanny ear for American public opinion, and she kept her 
rulings closely tethered to what most people wanted or at least 
would accept.  No one ever pursued centrism and moderation, 
those passionless creeds, with greater passion than O’Connor.  
No justice ever succeeded more in putting her stamp on the 
law.63 
Justice O’Connor’s legacy in the area of Title IX is apparent based on her 
decisions, ascribing that Title IX will cover sexual harassment actions against 
the educational institutions, whether the particular offending actors involved 
school employees or fellow students.64  She also captured the spirit of the Title 
IX paradigm by dictating that retaliation actions are a logical and appropriate 
basis for a lawsuit in order to effectuate the underlying goals of Title IX.65   
The standards Justice O’Connor authored will have a far-reaching impact 
on the students in this country.  While the jurist allowed for sexual harassment 
to be a potential subset within the Title IX scheme, she imposed strict 
standards to meet to be able to go forward.  Justice O’Connor predicated the 
standards principally upon the notice element—unless it is the official policy 
of the educational institution, in which case notice would not be required.  
Thus, as to the former situation, if the educational institution has notice of the 
offensive actions of their employees or students and essentially takes no good 
faith action to end or ameliorate the situation, then the school can be held 
responsible.  However, if the school does not have notice or knowledge of the 
situation, it prevents the entity from having the opportunity to take action, and 
                                                          
62.  TOOBIN, supra note 16, at 2.  He continued, “Few associate justices in history dominated a 
time so thoroughly or cast as many deciding votes as O’Connor—on important issues ranging from 
abortion to affirmative action, from executive war powers to the election of a president.”  Id. at 7.  See 
also Liptak, The Most Conservative Court in Decades, supra note 21, at 18 (indicating, “Until she 
retired in 2006, Justice O’Connor was very often the court’s swing vote, and in her later years she had 
drifted to the center-left.”). 
63.  TOOBIN, supra note 16, at 7–8. 
64.  See Davis, 526 U.S. 629; Gebser, 524 U.S. 274. 
65.  See Jackson, 544 U.S. 167. 
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thus, the entity should be shielded from the imposition of civil liability and the 
diminution of its treasuries for actions by their employees clearly not within 
the normal course of business. 
In the usual employment situation, respondeat superior prevails as the 
legal theory for personal injury actions to hold the employer liable for the 
actions of their employees undertaken in the normal course of business.  
Herein, the Court imposed a layer, so that schools would not be vicariously 
responsible for the odious sexual harassment actions taken by school 
employees, when the institutions were unaware of the actions.  The Court 
identified that notice is not needed to go forward with a Title IX claim where it 
is the school’s official policy.66  However, if not, then the potential plaintiff 
must place the “appropriate person” on notice.67  The problem engendered by 
this qualification is what category of individual at the educational institutions 
will fit this definition in order to withstand a motion to dismiss.  By not 
identifying the permissible categories, the Court essentially ignored the 
workings of the normal school system where students routinely come in 
contact with teachers and coaches and not the governing or administrative 
supervisory personnel.  The Court does a disservice if teachers and coaches—
operational employees—are not included to satisfy the notice requirement.68  
Regardless, Justice O’Connor began a dialogue with the country in Gebser, 
which she continued in Davis, cementing the determination that sexual 
harassment in schools that receive federal funds will not be tolerated, 
employing her nuanced notice requirements in both cases.   
In Jackson, the next installment in her trilogy, Justice O’Connor indicated 
that if the purpose of Title IX is to protect individuals being discriminated 
against, it must also protect the ones speaking out about the discriminatory 
practices.  The following syllogism comes to mind: If Title IX protects 
students, and teachers and coaches speak out about Title IX to protect the 
students, then the teachers and coaches who speak out should also be 
protected.  Justice O’Connor understood that schools should not be 
repositories of discrimination for our nation’s youth, even though she 
fashioned a pre-notice requirement.  The image of her holding the scales of 
                                                          
66.  Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290–91; see also Mansourian v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 602 F.3d 957 
(9th Cir. 2010) (case settled during 2012) (applying the “official policy” exception in an equal 
opportunity athletics-related case); Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 
2007) (case settled) (landmark decision, applying the “official policy” exception in a sexual 
harassment case involving an intercollegiate athletics department).   
67.  Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290–91; see also Mansourian, 602 F.3d 957; Simpson, 500 F.3d 1170. 
68.  See Heckman, Deconstructing Title IX Sexual Harassment, supra note 47, at 477 
(identifying three categories of educational employees: Tier I – Governing Employees, Tier II – 
Supervisory (Management) Employees, and Tier III – Operative or Operational Employees), 499 
(criticizing the standard applied). 
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justice comes to mind.  In her three Title IX decisions, the rulings or score was 
5–4.  Without the center fielder on the team, it remains to be seen how the 
Roberts Court will treat this civil rights statute intended to protect gender 
equity.69 
D.  The Roberts Court: Introducing the New Chief Umpire 
John G. Roberts, Jr. became the seventeenth Chief Justice of the U.S. 
Supreme Court on October 5, 2005, coinciding with the commencement of the 
October 2005–2006 term.  The Senate Judiciary Committee conducted four 
days of hearings from September 12–15, 2005, to discuss the background and 
temperament of Judge Roberts for the elevated position.70  The jurist’s 
comportment, during the hearing, is the gold standard for any judicial 
nominee.  The Senate Judiciary Committee was composed of the following 
seventeen men and one woman: Chairman Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.), 
Minority Chair Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), Sen. Orrin G. Hatch (R-Utah), Sen. 
Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.), Sen. Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa), Sen. 
Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (D-Del.) (since became Vice-President),71 Sen. Jon Kyl 
(R-Ariz.), Sen. Herbert Kohl (D-Wis.), Sen. Mike DeWine (R-Ohio), Sen. 
                                                          
69.  Cohen, supra note 16 (informing, “But Justice Thomas is a lot less marginal with the recent 
changes in the court – particularly the replacement of Sandra Day O’Connor, a moderate 
conservative, with Samuel Alito, a more extreme one.”). 
70.  See Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8 (The first day, September 12, 2005 
involved the presentation of the witness, Judge Roberts, along with his opening extemporaneous 
comments, id. at 1–56 (actual opening comments of Judge Roberts, at 55–56, including the “umpire” 
reference), followed by his official written responses, id. at 57–139; the first full day of questioning 
by the Senate Judiciary Committee occurred on Tuesday, September 13, 2005, id. at 141–282; the 
second day of questioning of the witness followed on Wednesday, September 14, 2005, id. at 283–
411; and the third and final day of questioning of the witness occurred on September 15, 2005, id. at 
413–451).  The Judiciary Committee ultimately voted 13-5 to approve the nomination.  On September 
29, 2005, the U.S. Senate confirmed the nomination 78-22; www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/ 
nominations/Nominations.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2012). 
71.  During January 2007, Sen. Biden (D-Del.) sought to become the 2008 Democratic candidate 
for President.  He subsequently withdrew his name from contention.  On January 20, 2009, he was 
sworn in as Vice President of the United States, along with President Barack Obama, a former U.S. 
Senator (D-Ill.).  Jeff Zeleny, For the 44th President, a Long Day Steeped in Pomp, History and 
Emotion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2009, at P1 (special supplement to mark the occasion of Barack 
Obama becoming the nation’s 44th President).  Chief Justice Roberts administered the oath of office 
to the new President.  Adam Liptak, A Few Rough Patches for a Presidential Oath, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
21, 2009, at P6.  Then-Sen. Obama voted against the elevation of Judge Roberts to the position of 
Chief Justice.  See obamaspeeches.com/031-Confirmation-of-Judge-John-Roberts-Obama-speech.htm 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2012).  See supra note 70.  Both President Obama and Chief Justice are graduates 
of Harvard Law School and former editors of the Harvard Law Review.  Roberts’ Confirmation 
Hearing, supra note 8, at 60.  Chief Justice Roberts attended the most recent January 2012 State of 
the Union address delivered by President Obama.  NBC News Coverage of State of the Union 
Address (Jan. 24, 2012, 9:20 EST). 
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Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.) (the only female on the 109th Senate Judiciary 
Committee), Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.), Sen. Russell D. Feingold (D-Wis.) 
(lost his re-election campaign), Sen. Lindsey O. Graham (R-S.C.), Sen. 
Charles E. Schumer (D-NY), Sen. John Cornyn (R-Tex.), Sen. Sam 
Brownback (R-Kan.),72 Sen. Richard J. Durbin (D-Ill.), and Sen. Tom Coburn 
(R-Okla.).  The interplay between Sen. Biden and Judge Roberts is especially 
poignant due to their current positions, respectively as Vice President of the 
United States and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.  Procedurally, the 
questioning started with the Republican Committee Chair and then alternated 
between the Democrat and Republican senators on the Committee, who 
wanted to interpose questions, or in some cases, commentary.  Unlike the 
remarks made on the floor of Congress reported in the Congressional Record, 
U.S. Senators do not have the privilege to edit their remarks for transcripts of 
hearings’ testimony.   
As indicated, during Judge Roberts’ Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings 
to become Chief Justice, he referred to his role as that of an umpire.73  In his 
opening statement to the Committee, he stated: 
Judge ROBERTS.  My personal appreciation that I owe a 
great debt to others reinforces my view that a certain humility 
should characterize the judicial role.  Judges and Justices are 
servants of the law, not the other way around.  Judges are like 
umpires.  Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them.  
The role of an umpire and a judge is critical.  They make sure 
everybody plays by the rules, but it is a limited role.  Nobody 
ever went to a ball game to see the umpire.74 
                                                          
72.  During January 2007, Sen. Brownback (R-Kan.) sought to become the 2008 Republican 
candidate to seek the presidency.  He announced his withdrawal from the race during October 2007.  
Brownback to End Presidential Run, Sources Say, CNNPOLITICS (Oct. 18, 2007), http://articles.cnn. 
com/2007-10-18/politics/brownback.dropout_1_presidential-campaign-senator-brownback-opinion-
research-corporation?_s=PM:POLITICS. 
73.  Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8, at 161. 
74.  Id. at 55 (Sen. Kohl noted,  
[b]ut as all of us with any involvement in sports know, no two umpires or no two referees 
have the same strike zone or call the same kind of a basketball game, and ballplayers and 
basketball players understand that, depending upon who the umpire is and who the referee 
is, the game can be called entirely differently. 
 Id. at 203.  Sen. Hatch (R-Utah) commented, “Yesterday you used the analogy of an umpire who 
calls balls and strikes, but neither pitches, nor bats.”  Id. at 161.  Sen. Grassley (R-Iowa) inquired, 
“So, Judge Roberts, beyond your umpire analogy, what do you understand to be the role of a judge in 
a democratic society?”  Id. at 177). 
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Of course, cartoonists and the legislators would pounce on this accessible 
imagery of the baseball umpire.  Additionally, during his opening remarks and 
elsewhere, Judge Roberts talked about wanting to be a modest jurist,75 
reprising the umpire imagery.  He asserted:  
Mr. Chairman, I come before the Committee with no agenda.  
I have no platform. . . . If I am confirmed, I will confront 
every case with an open mind.  I will fully and fairly analyze 
the legal arguments that are presented.  I will be open to the 
considered views of my colleagues on the bench, and I will 
decide every case based on the record, according to the rule of 
law, without fear or favor, to the best of my ability, and I will 
remember that it’s my job to call balls and strikes, and not to 
pitch or bat.76  
Interestingly, considering the breadth of topics that may be entertained 
during this type of hearing, there was testimony or inquiry as to three of the 
Title IX Supreme Court decisions, and the Civil Rights Restoration Act, which 
is a rather remarkable scenario.77  Judge Roberts did not entertain any Title IX 
cases during his relatively brief tenure as a Circuit Court judge.  However, he 
was involved with Title IX cases while working for the federal government 
and as a private attorney.  A certain consistency was exhibited in all three of 
these cases, where Mr. Roberts (referred to as Mr. Roberts or Attorney Roberts 
for when he was working as an attorney to distinguish his judicial career) 
purportedly argued to limit or constrain the reach of Title IX.78  Granted in the 
first and second cases, Grove City College79 and Franklin,80 Mr. Roberts was 
working in the executive branch of the U.S. Government (respectively as 
Special Assistant to the Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice (Aug. 
1981–Nov. 1982) during President Reagan’s first term; Associate Counsel to 
President Ronald Reagan, White House Counsel’s Office (Nov. 1982–May 
1986); and a member of the legal staff at the U.S. Department of Justice – 
Principal Deputy Solicitor General (Oct. 1989–Jan. 1993) during President 
George H.W. Bush’s administration), and thus was charged with presenting 
the role of his employer.81  And according to Judge Roberts, he “was not 
                                                          
75.  See id. at 55. 
76.  Id. at 56. 
77.  See infra Parts III, IV and V.  See also Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8. 
78.  Id. 
79.  See generally Grove City Coll., 465 U.S. 555. 
80.  See generally Franklin, 503 U.S. 60. 
81.  See Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8, at 58, 69, 72. 
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formulating policy.”82  However, in the third case, NCAA v. Smith,83 the 
NCAA had its own in-house counsel, and Mr. Roberts, who was then a 
seasoned lawyer and partner at a prestigious law firm, was hired as a private 
attorney to represent the most influential and powerful athletic association in 
the country.   
During the 1990s, a few litigants commenced cases arguing violation of 
both Title IX and the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),84 a 
congressional statute aimed at protecting women from violence.  The 
Rehnquist Court ultimately ruled the VAWA legislation was unconstitutional 
as exceeding the Article I powers conferred upon Congress in the U.S. 
Constitution.85  In a question from Sen. Joseph Biden, a strong supporter of 
the VAWA statute, the following interaction occurred: 
Senator BIDEN.  Okay.  Judge, is gender discrimination, as 
you have written in a memo, a “perceived” problem or is it a 
real problem? 
Judge ROBERTS.  The memo you talked about, Senator, I’ve 
had a chance to look at it.  It concerned a 50-State inventory 
of particular proposals to address it.  “Perceived” was not 
                                                          
82.  Id. at 175.  See infra note 114 (explaining the role of the U.S. Solicitor General.  However, 
in his written response, he explained his governmental work:  “Immediately prior to joining [a private 
law firm] for the first time in 1986, I served in counseling and advisory roles in the federal 
government.  My duties as Associate Counsel to the President involved reviewing bills submitted to 
the President for signature or veto, drafting and reviewing executive orders and proclamations, and 
generally reviewing the full range of Presidential activities for potential legal problems.”  Roberts’ 
Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8, at 71.  As to his work as the Special Assistant to the U.S. 
Attorney General, Judge Roberts informed that “My duties. . . were also of an advisory nature, 
focusing on particular matters of concern to the Attorney General.”  Id. at 72. 
83.  See generally Smith, 525 U.S. 459. 
84.  42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994). 
85.  See Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997) (The 
plaintiff-female student claimed she was raped by two university male football players.  She alleged a 
violation of Title IX and the VAWA, based on allegations of preferential treatment provided to one of 
the alleged perpetrators, and lack of proper protocol in following the university procedure for inquiry 
into this kind of case), en banc decision vacating an earlier court decision; Brzonkala v. Va. 
Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (7–4 ruling), aff’d, sub nom. United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (ruling the federal statute was unconstitutional in violation of 
the Commerce Clause.  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8).  Previously,  in Ericson v. Syracuse University, 45 F. 
Supp. 2d 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), a New York district court had upheld the constitutionality of the 
VAWA, in another dual Title IX-VAWA case predicated on allegations of sexual harassment by the 
male women’s tennis coach toward two of his female tennis players.  The parties ultimately settled 
the case.  See Diane Heckman, Title IX and Sexual Harassment Claims Involving Educational Athletic 
Department Employees and Student-Athletes in the Twenty-First Century, 8 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 
223, 243-44 (2009) [hereinafter Heckman, Title IX and Sexual Harassment Claims] (discussing the 
case); Heckman, Is Notice Required?, supra note 3, at 202–03 (same) . 
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being used in that case to suggest that there was any doubt 
that there is gender discrimination and that it should be 
addressed. . . .  
Of course, gender discrimination is a serious problem.  It’s a 
particular concern of mine and always has been.  I grew up 
with three sisters, all of whom work outside the home.  I 
married a lawyer who works outside the home.  I have a 
young daughter who I hope will have all of the opportunities 
available to her without regard to any gender discrimination. 
There is no suggestion in anything that I’ve written of any 
resistance to the basic idea of full citizenship without regard 
to gender.86 
Title IX litigants have also asserted violations of the Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection Clause.87  The Supreme Court has imposed 
three tests to ascertain if a violation of this provision of the Fourteenth 
Amendment has occurred: (1) a strict scrutiny test is imposed for fundamental 
rights (education is not deemed a fundamental right)88 and for classifications 
based on suspect classes (based on race, alienage or national origin);89 notably, 
it does not include sex within that arena; (2) an intermediate test has been 
imposed for classifications based on an individual’s sex (gender) or birth 
legitimacy; and (3) a reasonable relationship test90 is used for all other 
classifications, such as those based on age or disability.  Later on in the 
hearing, Judge Roberts discussed the three tiers relative to the Fourteenth 
                                                          
86.  Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8, at 190.  There were a number of references to 
the Morrison case during the hearings with the Senators, understandably quite concerned about the 
judicial infringement on their ability to legislate.  Id. at 225, 356. 
87.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, which directs, in part: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.  No State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws. 
88.  San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).  See Diane Heckman, 
Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process Governing Interscholastic Athletics, 5 VA. SPORTS 
& ENT. L.J. 1, 15 (2005) [hereinafter Heckman, Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process]. 
89.  See Diane Heckman, The First Amendment and Academia: Twenty Years of Examining 
Matters of Public Concern, 188 EDUC. L. REP. 585 (2004). 
90.  “Under ‘traditional’ equal protection analysis, a legislative classification must be sustained 
unless it is ‘patently arbitrary’ and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental 
interest.”  Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973). 
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Amendment Equal Protection Clause, where he proffered,  
Gender issues are in the middle tier because the Court thinks 
that there are situations where distinctions can be justified, 
and there are other situations—but it’s more than just the 
rational relation, but not as suspect as the most heightened 
level because there may be other justifications.  Cases 
throughout the Court’s history where they have upheld 
distinctions under that analysis, like the all-male draft, for 
example, that was upheld . . .  
. . . . 
. . . Justice Ginsburg, I think, in her opinion in the VMI case 
said that the intermediate scrutiny had to be applied with—I 
forgot the exact phrase—”exacting rigor” or something along 
those lines, to indicate that it is well beyond the rational 
relation test, but it’s not as inherently suspect as racial 
classifications.91 
Historically, the 1972 Equal Rights Amendment would have deemed sex a 
suspect class and thus entitled to the greatest legal protection.92  However, this 
constitutional amendment was not ratified by the necessary two-thirds of states 
within the allotted time period.  During 1973, in Frontiero v. Richardson, the 
Supreme Court would impose the highest test to classifications based on sex; 
however, its utility is circumscribed, as this was only a plurality decision.93  
The Court first referenced the intermediate test in Craig v. Boren.94  In 
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, the Court fleshed out a 
pervasiveness justification requirement for state action to be deemed 
constitutional when classifications are based upon an individual’s sex.95  
                                                          
91.  Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8, at 281–82 (referring to United States v. 
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)). 
92.  H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong.  (1971) (approved by the House of Representatives on Oct. 12, 
1971).  It would have required that “[e]quality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged 
by the United States or by any State on account of sex.”  Id.  See H.R. Equal Rights for Men and 
Women (July 14, 1971), to accompany H.R.J. Res. 208, available at www.archives.gov/ 
legislative/features/griffiths/committee-report.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2012). 
93.  See generally Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677. 
94.  Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (directing that such classifications “by gender 
must serve important government objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those 
objectives.”).  See also Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (allowing female wage earners to 
lop off their three lowest earning years when calculating Social Security benefits to remedy past 
discrimination, whereas male workers were not treated the same). 
95.  Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982) (mandating an “exceedingly 
persuasive” standard).  The Court also imparted, “In limited circumstances, a gender-based 
HECKMAN_FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/2012  1:54 PM 
2012] BATTER UP  483 
Later, in United States v. Virginia,96 the Court reiterated the “pervasiveness 
justification” test in a case dealing with whether females could be restricted 
from admission to the Virginia Military College, one of the two remaining all-
male public colleges in the country.97  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg instructed:  
Parties who seek to defend gender-based government action 
must demonstrate an “exceedingly persuasive justification” 
for that action . . . .  Focusing on the differential treatment or 
denial of opportunity for which relief is sought, the reviewing 
court must determine whether the proffered justification is 
“exceedingly persuasive.”  The burden of justification is 
demanding and it rests entirely on the State . . . .  The 
justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented 
post hoc in response to litigation.  And it must not rely on 
overbroad generalizations about the different talents, 
capacities, or preferences of males and females.98 
As one court stated, “[i]n sex discrimination cases brought under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiff must demonstrate that the discrimination was 
intentional.”99  The Equal Protection Clause has been the legal theory for 
redress in many actions in the area of gender equity involving extracurricular 
athletic activities.100  As a Second Circuit Court judge wrote, “[i]t is 
                                                                                                                                           
classification favoring one sex can be justified if it intentionally and directly assists members of the 
sex that is disproportionately burdened.”  Id. at 728. 
96.  See generally 518 U.S. 515 (emphasizing the “exceedingly persuasive” standard) (Justice 
Ginsburg authored the majority opinion; Chief Justice Rehnquist issued a concurring opinion joining 
in on the judgment rendered, while Justice Scalia presented his dissent, id. at 558 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting)) (Justice Clarence Thomas recused himself as his son was attending Virginia Military 
Institute at the time of the appeal). 
97.  The Citadel, located in South Carolina, was the country’s other public military school.  It 
was also embroiled in litigation challenging its all-male admission policy.  See United States v. Jones, 
136 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 1998).  See also Faulkner v. Jones, 10 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 1993). 
98.  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531–33.  Justice Ginsburg also cited material in a letter 
from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval.  Id. at 532.  See Heckman, Sex Discrimination in the 
Gym, supra note 4, at 556–58; Heckman, Scoreboard, supra note 4, at 394. 
99.  Croteau v. Fair, 686 F. Supp. 552, 553 (E.D. Va. 1988) (discussed within).  Upon its remand 
from the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit Court in Cannon, 648 F.2d at 1107, stated, “A violation 
of the Equal Protection clause had previously been held to require a finding of intentional 
discrimination; disparate impact alone will not support a cause of action under the Constitution.”  
100.  See Heckman, Women & Athletics, supra note 4, at 4 n.14.  See, e.g., Miami Univ. 
Wrestling Club v. Miami Univ., 195 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (S.D. Ohio 2001), aff’d, 802 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 
2002), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1145 (1999) (men’s wrestling team); Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 
F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 1999) (men’s swimming and wrestling teams), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1284 (2000); 
Bruneau v. S. Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 163 F.3d 749 (2d Cir. 1998) (sexual harassment action), cert. 
denied, 526 U.S. 1145 (1999); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992) (granting of a 
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irrefutable that Congress could not, by enacting a statute like Title IX, 
somehow erode or limit a constitutional right such as the right to equal 
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States.”101  
Surprisingly, Judge Roberts could not identify the actual test.102 
A review of the salient material from the Roberts’ confirmation hearings is 
presented within; for an introspection as to how this jurist viewed critical 
aspects of Title IX.  Part III discusses the provision of compensatory money 
                                                                                                                                           
preliminary injunction in favor of female student-athletes), aff’d, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993), 101 
F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996) (sanctioning the grant of a permanent injunction for the plaintiffs), cert. 
denied, 520 U.S. 1186 (1997) (retaining two women’s intercollegiate sports: gymnastics and 
volleyball); Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 43 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 1994) (interscholastic 
fastpitch softball) (finding no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause); 
Kelley v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 35 F.3d 265, 272 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding no violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause) (male student-athletes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1128 
(1995); Sullivan v. Cleveland Heights, 869 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding no equal protection 
violation concerning a 10-year-old  female who was not allowed to use the same locker room as her 
male teammates on the community hockey team); Ridgeway v. Mont. High Sch. Ass’n, 858 F.2d 579 
(9th Cir. 1988) (concerning scheduling of certain girls’ interscholastic teams); Cook v. Colgate Univ., 
802 F. Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (elevating women’s ice hockey club team to an intercollegiate 
sport), vacated as moot, 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993); O’Connor v. Bd. of Educ., 645 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 
1981), on remand, 545 F. Supp. 376, 380 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (denying female’s request seeking 
participation on boys’ basketball team); Cape v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 424 F. Supp. 
732 (E.D. Tenn. 1976), rev’d, 563 F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1977) (examining differing rules used for girls’ 
versus boys’ high school basketball and finding no Fourteenth Amendment violation); Barnett v. Tex. 
Wrestling Ass’n, 16 F. Supp. 2d 690 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (female student seeking participation on the all 
boys’ interscholastic wrestling team); Adams v. Baker, 919 F. Supp. 1496, 1500 (D. Kan. 1996) 
(wrestling) (finding a violation of the female student-athlete’s rights pursuant to the Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection Clause) (interscholastic wrestling); Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 837 F. Supp. 
989 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (awarding of athletic scholarships at this private university); Lantz v. Ambach, 
620 F. Supp. 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (female seeking to participate on all-boys’ interscholastic football 
team); Force v. Pierce City R-VI Sch. Dist., 570 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (female student 
seeking to participate on the all boys’ eighth grade football team); Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. 
Supp. 164 (D. Colo. 1977) (female student-athlete seeking participation on the all boys’ junior varsity 
soccer team); Jones v. Okla. Secondary Sch. Activities Ass’n, 453 F. Supp. 150 (W.D. Okla. 1977) 
(alleging a detrimental impact by having female use girls’ basketball rules, which included using 
merely half the court, as opposed to the boys’ basketball rules, using the full court); Leffel v. Wis. 
Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 444 F. Supp. 1117, 1123 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (concerning lack of certain 
teams for the girls, including any baseball or tennis teams) (finding a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause); Gilpin v. Kan. State High Sch. Activities Ass’n, 377 F. Supp. 1233 (D. Kan. 1973) (there 
was only a cross-country track team for boys and none for the girls); Haas v. S. Bend Cmty. Sch. 
Corp., 289 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. 1972) (interscholastic golf team) (finding athletic association rule which 
prevented “mixed competition” in non-contact sports violated the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 
501).  See also Heckman, Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process, supra note 88, at 16 n.68 
(listing a number of Title IX related cases where the courts held that no property interest was 
triggered needed to satisfy a prima facie Fourteenth Amendment case, whereby a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that a life, liberty or property interest was triggered). 
101.  Bruneau, 163 F.3d at 763 (Oakes, C.J., concurring).  See Heckman, Title IX Tapestry, supra 
note 25, at 859 (providing background information on the jurisdictional and procedural matters 
involved in Title IX litigation). 
102.  See Bruneau, 163 F.3d 749.  See also supra text accompanying note 99. 
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damages, at issue in the Franklin case, which is positioned as a procedural 
aspect (because a potential plaintiff would want to know what remediation is 
available when drafting a complaint and pursuing litigation).  This is followed 
by an examination of the jurisdictional aspect of necessitating the receipt of 
federal funds by the defendant, at issue in the Grove City College and NCAA v. 
Smith cases, which is presented in Parts IV and V.  Two points that need 
emphasizing: first, Mr. Roberts was operating in the rarefied highest echelons 
of Republican politics; and second, this individual has an extraordinary 
command of the English language and facility in answering questions so that a 
review of his oral and written remarks are instructive.  Clearly, this is a 
brilliant and successful man, a multi-millionaire, with an impeccable 
curriculum vitae, including being a graduate of Harvard University Law 
School, editor of the Harvard Law Review, a former law clerk to Chief Justice 
Rehnquist (1980–1981), as well as one of the “go to guys” to argue a case 
before the Supreme Court, before being placed on possibly the most influential 
Circuit Court in the country today, the District of Columbia Circuit Court.103  
III.  TITLE IX REMEDIES: “SHOW ME THE MONEY”104 – STRIKE ONE 
Overall, the possible remedies available to a Title IX plaintiff would be 
the following: (1) the withdrawal of federal funds to the educational 
institution, which is explicitly permitted by the statute;105 (2) declarative 
relief, to declare the rights of the parties;106 (3) injunctive relief to order the 
educational institution to cease engaging in the discriminatory action or to 
undertake certain actions to ameliorate the situation;107 and (4) the award of 
monetary damages.  The issue of what damages are permitted has been an area 
of contention.  This is once again fostered due to the lack of statutory language 
concerning the issuance of damages.108   
A.  Compensatory Damages 
Litigants routinely sought injunctive relief to end the Title IX 
                                                          
103.  Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8, at 57–71, 133. 
104.  Dialogue from the movie, JERRY MAGUIRE (Gracie Films & TriStar Pictures 1996).   
105.  20 U.S.C. § 1682. 
106.  See, e.g., Leffel, 444 F. Supp. at 1119. 
107.  See, e.g., Cohen, 991 F.2d at 907 (affirming the grant of a preliminary injunction in favor 
of the female student-athletes) (The Court stated, “On the record compiled to date, the preliminary 
injunction requiring Brown [University] to reinstate its women’s volleyball and gymnastics teams for 
the time being came well within the encincture of judicial discretion.  We will not meddle.”); Roberts 
v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 833 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[W]e believe monetary relief alone 
is inadequate.  The district court correctly ordered an equitable remedy.”). 
108.  20 U.S.C. § 1682. 
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discriminatory activity, or less frequently, declaratory action relief.  
Remarkably, it would take until 1992, in Franklin,109 when the Supreme 
Court—in its third Title IX decision—ruled that a plaintiff could be awarded 
pecuniary damages, where intentional discrimination was proven.110  It was 
this opinion that triggered a groundswell of litigation, so that in addition to 
seeking court orders to cease the gender-based discrimination, now the 
students and educational employees sought to be compensated for the 
purported violations.  Large judgments have not been the norm, generally due 
to the history of Title IX, the burden on litigants to successfully assert a prima 
facie case,111 and the delayed pronouncement that compensatory damages 
were permitted.112  There was some dicta, by the Supreme Court in Gebser, a 
post-Franklin case, as to whether compensatory damages should issue in a 
case involving allegations of sexual harassment.113  The Court has provided no 
further comments on the issue of monetary damages—thus, the status quo 
exists. 
B.  Roberts’ 2005 Judiciary Committee Confirmation Hearing 
The Supreme Court invited the Federal Government to weigh in on the 
issue of whether it should grant the petition for a writ of certiorari in the 
Franklin case to address the issue whether the Title IX statute allowed for 
compensatory damages.  The U.S. Solicitor General’s brief asserted the 
affirmative position that the Court should review the case, but that damages 
should not be allowed.114  This first brief filed by U.S. Solicitor General 
                                                          
109.  Franklin, 503 U.S. 60.  See Heckman, Title IX Tapestry, supra note 25, at 867. 
110.  Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76. 
111.  See infra text accompanying note 129. 
112.  See Croteau, 686 F. Supp. 552 (where the female high school student unsuccessfully 
sought $100,000 in compensatory damages for not being put on the boys’ varsity interscholastic 
baseball team).  Julie Croteau went on to appear in the movie, A LEAGUE OF THEIR OWN (Columbia 
Pictures Corporation 1992), depicting a women’s professional softball team during World War II.  
However, settlements in certain Title IX sexual harassment cases have resulted in large monetary 
figures.  See Heckman, Title IX and Sexual Harassment Claims, supra note 85, at 252, 267, 269. 
113.  Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284.  See also Heckman, Title IX Tapestry, supra note 25, at 867. 
114.  Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Sch. Dist. (1992) 
(No. 90-918), 1991 WL 11009216, at *20 (filed on May 20, 1991, by the Hon. Kenneth W. Starr, 
U.S. Solicitor General).  Like Justice Roberts, Starr was also a law clerk to Chief Justice William J. 
Rehnquist (1975–1977), and a judge on the District of Columbia Circuit Court (1983–1989).  Starr 
was Solicitor General (1989–1993) during President George H.R. Bush’s administration.  The 
nominee explained the role indicating that he “worked in the Department of Justice in the Office of 
the Solicitor General, it was my job to argue cases for the United States before the Supreme Court.  I 
always found it very moving to stand before the Justices and say, ‘I speak for my country.’”  Roberts’ 
Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8, at 55.  He further elaborated, “With minor exceptions, the Office 
of the Solicitor General is the exclusive representative of the federal government before the Supreme 
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Kenneth W. Starr, which featured the name of John G. Roberts, Jr. 
prominently in the third position as Deputy Solicitor General, interjected, “[i]n 
our view, the [Eleventh Circuit] court of appeals was correct in its conclusion 
that Title IX does not impliedly authorize a private plaintiff to recover 
compensatory legal damages, even if the plaintiff alleges an intentional 
violation of the statute.”115  The Court agreed to hear this appeal during the 
October 1991 term.  The Court permitted the U.S. Solicitor General to 
participate in oral arguments as to the merits of the case.116 
The Senate Committee questioned Judge Roberts on his contemporaneous 
view of Franklin.  As a deputy attorney working with Kenneth Starr, then U.S. 
Solicitor General, Mr. Roberts’ name appeared on a brief on the merits 
purportedly arguing that the female student subject to physical sexual 
harassment was not entitled to monetary damages, according to Sen. Patrick 
Leahy (D-Vt.) (Minority Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee) [internal 
footnotes are used to annotate the material].   
Senator LEAHY.  Justice White, in an opinion joined by 
Justice O’Connor and others wrote that you fundamentally 
misunderstood the law and history of the Court’s role in 
providing appropriate remedy for such abuse, and that you 
had invited them to abdicate their historical judicial authority 
to award appropriate relief [pursuant to Title IX].   
So do you now personally agree with and accept as binding 
law the reasoning of Justice White’s opinion in Franklin?117 
Judge ROBERTS.  Well, it certainly is a precedent of the 
Court that I would apply under [the] principle[] of stare 
decisis.  The Government’s position in that case, of course, in 
no way condoned the activities involved.  The issue was an 
open one.  The courts of appeals had ruled the same way that 
the Government had argued before the Supreme Court, and it 
arose because we were dealing with an implied right of action, 
in other words, [a] right of action under the statute that courts 
                                                                                                                                           
Court.”  Id. at 72.  See Dennis J. Hutchinson, Rehnquist’s Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2002, § 7, at 14 
(reviewing the following autobiography, KENNETH W. STARR, FIRST AMONG EQUALS (2002), 
wherein “Starr concedes that ‘justices appointed for life’ constitute ‘the least accountable branch of 
government.’”).  The Solicitor General is the “President’s chief advocate before the Supreme Court.”  
TOOBIN, supra note 16, at 16. 
115.  Brief of the United States, supra note 114, at *6.  See Heckman, Women & Athletics, supra 
note 4, at 23 n.100. 
116.  Franklin, 502 U.S. 803.  See Heckman, Women & Athletics, supra note 4, at 23 n.101. 
117.  Franklin, 503 U.S. at 72–73. 
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had implied.  The reason that there was difficulty in 
determining exactly what remedies were available is because 
Congress had not addressed that question.  The remedies that 
were available, as we explained, included issues such as 
restitution, backpay, injunctive relief, and the open issue, 
again, was whether damages were available.  The Supreme 
Court issued its ruling and cleared that up.118 
This colloquy featured no mention of the Third Circuit’s 1990 opinion in 
Pfeiffer v. Marion Center Area School District,119 reflecting the opposite 
viewpoint that could have alternatively been adopted by the federal 
government when invited to offer its position in the Franklin case.   
Parenthetically, the Title IX statute contains absolutely no explicit mention 
of providing “backpay”—essentially this was a transfer of Title VII remedies 
onto Title IX.  This emphasis by the nominee on indicating that the statute 
allowed for backpay and the only unsettled aspect was the money damages is a 
bit of a mystery.  A review of the Supreme Court decision in Franklin120 
illustrates that the Court devoted specific attention to the issue of backpay and 
responded in unequivocal language as to what it thought of the Government’s 
position.  While remedies could be limited where legislation was hinged upon 
the Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution, this did not apply when 
intentional discrimination appeared.  The Court stated, “[f]inally, the United 
States asserts that the remedies permissible under Title IX should nevertheless 
be limited to backpay and prospective relief.  In addition to diverging from our 
traditional approach to deciding what remedies are available for violation of a 
                                                          
118.  Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8, at 156–57 (emphasis added).  It was curious 
that Judge Roberts identified the remedy of “backpay,” which while common in Title VII 
employment actions, was not in Title IX cases.  The author cannot recall one pre-Franklin case where 
a court awarded a plaintiff backpay pursuant to Title IX.  In addition, the controversy over whether 
Title IX could be used at all by an educational employee to successfully seek redress for sex 
discrimination by an educational institution was and remains a contested issue.  See supra Section 
III(A).  See Heckman, Sex Discrimination in the Gym, supra note 4, at 597–600 (citing Tyler v. 
Howard Univ., No. 91-CA11239 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Sept. 15, 1995) (post-Franklin ruling awarding the 
female basketball coach damages for retaliation and lost pay for breach of both Title IX and a District 
of Columbia statute)). 
119.  917 F.2d 779, 789 (3d Cir. 1990) (herein a female sought compensatory damages for her 
dismissal from the local chapter of a National Honor Society, due to her pregnancy.  The National 
Women’s Law Center represented the former high school student.  The Third Circuit Court accessed 
the Cannon opinion, stating, “the Supreme Court indicated that Congress intended to create remedies 
in Title IX comparable to those available under Title VI.”  Id. at 787.  The court continued, “Tracking 
this analysis to a Title IX claim, we now conclude, not without some difficulty, that compensatory 
relief is available for certain Title IX violations and that this is one of them.”  Id. at 788).  See supra 
note 112 (concerning the 1988 Croteau litigation). 
120.  Franklin, 503 U.S. 60.   
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federal right, this position conflicts with sound logic.”121  The Court 
continued, “[b]ackpay does nothing for petitioner [a student] . . . and [since] 
she herself no longer attends a school in the Gwinnett system, prospective 
relief accords her no remedy at all.  The Government’s answer that 
administrative action helps other similarly situated students in effect 
acknowledges that its approach would leave petitioner remediless.”122  That 
the jurist, in the interim decade, never updated his understanding of the 
remediation Title IX affords, despite the Franklin ruling on a case he worked 
on, is distressing.   
And, of significance, while Judge Roberts answered the direct question 
posed by the Senator in his first sentence, the remainder of the jurist’s 
response was essentially a summary of the Government’s argument presented 
to the Court.  It was certainly not an effusive endorsement of the Franklin 
ruling, but simply an abstract declaration of a fundamental element of 
American jurisprudence.  Significantly, Judge Roberts did, however, indicate 
his intent to apply the Court’s holding. 
The colloquy about this case continued with Sen. Leahy stressing the 
sexual abuse the tenth-grade female student had received by a male teacher 
and “sports coach” in the Franklin case.  After receiving Judge Roberts’ 
response, Sen. Leahy then asked: 
Senator LEAHY.  Now, do you feel that they [the Supreme 
Court] were acting, even though it went differently than what 
you had argued [on behalf of the Government], do you feel 
the Court’s opinion is based on sound reasoning? 
Judge ROBERTS.  Well, I don’t want to say— 
Senator LEAHY.  Do you think it is a solid precedent? 
Judge ROBERTS.  It is a solid—it’s a precedent of the Court.  
It was, as you say, a unanimous precedent.  It concerned an 
issue of statutory interpretation because it was unclear 
                                                          
121.  Id. at 75 (The Court continued, “First, both remedies are equitable in nature, and it is 
axiomatic that a court should determine the adequacy of a remedy in law before resorting to equitable 
relief.”  Id. 75–76).  Brief of the United States, supra note 113, at *19. 
The same objectives should inform the scope of any private remedies under Title IX.  
Equitable relief—including, when appropriate, such “make whole” relief as backpay—
serves to enforce compliance with the statute.  Awards of legal damages to selected 
beneficiaries of federal financing programs, by contrast, would threaten “a potentially 
massive financial liability,” . . . while securing compliance only indirectly through 
deterrence. 
Id. 
122.  Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76. 
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whether Congress had intended a particular remedy to be 
available or not.  That was the question before the Court.  The 
court of appeals had ruled one way.  The Supreme Court ruled 
the other way. 
The administration’s position was based on the principle that 
the decision about the remedy of backpay was a decision that 
should be made by Congress and not the Court.  The Court 
saw the case the other, and that issue is now settled, and those 
damages actions are brought in courts around the country.123 
Judge Roberts started to mirror the senator’s characterization in the first 
sentence of this reply and then, according to the transcript, immediately put 
the reins on the statement, simply as he did initially with this line of inquiry 
introduced by this senator, stating the obvious and nothing more. 
Sen. Leahy then called Judge Roberts on the backpay remedy, inquiring 
what type of backpay would a student receive, which was a fair point—and 
again, Title IX, even before Franklin, was not known by the courts for ever 
awarding backpay.  It was as if the Title VII statute was being substituted for 
this Title IX matter, which is surprising because the nominee was so 
knowledgeable about the law, providing detailed legal discourse to the 
Committee, and by extension the Nation, on many legal topics.  While Judge 
Roberts found the underlying behavior in the Franklin case “abhorrent 
then . . . [and] now,”124 one can see the verbal agility or dexterity of this 
individual,125 as he immediately dropped the backpay quest, and responded: 
Judge ROBERTS.  Restitution and injunction to prohibit the 
harmful activity.  Again, the issue arose because Congress had 
not spelled out whether there was a right of action in the first 
place or what the components of that right of action should be.  
The issue— 
Senator LEAHY.  We will go back to this in my next round, I 
                                                          
123.  Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8, at 157 (emphasis added).  See Brief of the 
United States, supra note 114, at *15 (“We believe that the statute is not framed in terms suggesting 
that awards of damages are essential for effective enforcement.”). 
124.  Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8, at 157. 
125.  In the written questionnaire, as to supplying the text of any speeches that the nominee may 
have given, Judge Roberts replied that he used none—that there were no prepared texts, which was 
evident by the judicial candidate not referring to a written text during his opening remarks to the 
Senate Judiciary Committee.  Id. at 67 (“On no occasion did I speak from a prepared text.  Notes or 
recordings are available only as indicated.”  There were notes for only two of the many public 
speeches). 
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can assure you.  My time is up.126 
Thus, in all that banter, the best that Judge Roberts could say about the 
Supreme Court opinion in Franklin was that it was a precedent.  For a man so 
extraordinarily facile and in command of his words, as exemplified by his 
enormous scholarly and legal achievements and being hired to argue numerous 
cases before the Supreme Court, his inability to verbalize the sentence that it 
was a “strong precedent” as opposed to merely a precedent should not be 
comforting for advocates of Title IX.127  The words of Justice Scalia are 
triggered, wherein he begrudgingly supported the majority position in 
Franklin, with his reasoning that essentially too much water had passed under 
the bridge.128 
On September 15, 2005, Sen. Leahy did return to the Franklin case. 
Senator LEAHY  [summarily going through the Court’s 
rationale] Now, the reason I raise this case [Franklin] is not 
that it is one of those rare ones where you were on the losing 
side, but I raise it because I felt it was a case about what our 
courts should do, including doing justice and remedying rights 
and protecting Americans. 
So my question to you is this: Do you now recognize that the 
Supreme Court’s view in the case as set forth in Justice 
White’s opinion was the right one and the positions of the 
United States in your brief were the wrong ones? 
Judge ROBERTS.  Well, as a judge looking at it, obviously 
when you lose a case, as you point out, [9-0] it’s a pretty clear 
signal that the legal position you were advocating was the 
wrong one.  The position the administration took in that case 
was the same position that the court of appeals had taken. . . . 
                                                          
126.  Id. at 157.  
127.  Id. (emphasis added).  Later on in the hearing, Sen. Sessions (R-Alabama) would afford 
Judge Roberts an opportunity to bolster that what he did at the time was advocating the position of the 
“highest Federal court in the land at that time.”  Id. at 230. 
128.  Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76–78 (Scalia, J., concurring) (commenting it was “too late in the 
day.”  Id. at 78).  Judge Roberts revealed, “And at argument sometimes, Justice Scalia would not be 
as receptive to an argument based on legislative history as some of the others, but, again, the name of 
the game is counting to five when you’re arguing up there.”  Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra 
note 8, at 320.  This recounts Justice Brennan’s “Rule of Five,” referring to the number of Supreme 
Court justices needed to form a majority.  See TOOBIN, supra note 16, at 84–85 (Like the other 
justices, Breyer knew the famous question that William Brennan used to ask his law clerks.  “What’s 
the most important law at the Supreme Court?”  . . . the justice would raise his tiny hand and say, 
“Five!  The law of five!  With five votes, you can do anything around here!”). 
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. . . 
Senator LEAHY.  And I understand that.  I thought I sort of 
laid that out earlier.  But my question is: Do you now accept 
that Justice White’s position was right and that the 
Government’s position was wrong? 
Judge ROBERTS.  Well, I certainly accept the decision of the 
Court, the 9–0 decision, as you say, as a binding precedent of 
the Court and, again, have no cause or agenda to revisit it or 
any quarrel with it.129 
This is another example of the jurist’s ability to parse his words and stand 
his ground, accepting the decision as precedent, but not answering whether it 
was the right position.  For Title IX advocates, this would constitute strike one 
against Title IX. 
IV.  THE RECEIPT OF FEDERAL FUNDS: STRIKE TWO 
A.  Recipient of Federal Funds by the Educational Institutions 
In order to establish a general Title IX prima facie case, the following 
elements are required: (1) the defendant took discriminatory action against the 
plaintiff based on the plaintiff’s sex; (2) the defendant is an educational 
institution; (3) that is a recipient of federal funds; and (4) the plaintiff placed 
the defendant on notice, prior to the lawsuit, about the discriminatory action, 
unless it was the official policy of the educational institution.130  The third 
aspect would be contentious.  It is rare for an educational institution not to 
receive federal funds.131  Whether the particular program or activity received 
federal funds (program-specific approach), or it was sufficient for some part of 
the educational institution to receive federal funds and thus trigger oversight 
over the entire institution and all its separate programs and activities 
(institution-wide approach) was an issue that would ultimately land before the 
Supreme Court.   
In Grove City College, the Supreme Court, in eschewing a broad 
interpretation, found that the particular program or activity that is alleged to be 
                                                          
129.  Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8, at 413–14. 
130.  See Heckman, Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, supra note 33, at 2–3; 
Heckman, Title IX Tapestry, supra note 25, at 849, 850.  
131.  But see Buckley v. Archdiocese of Rockville Ctr., 992 F. Supp. 586, 590 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) 
(finding that a private coed Roman Catholic high school and the overseeing archdiocese were not 
under Title IX solely because the diocese received the services of a single employee of the public 
school district, a school psychologist). 
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at the core of the Title IX sex discrimination, must receive the actual federal 
funds for the lawsuit to proceed.132  As one court recounted about the lawsuit 
commenced against the Secretary of Education, 
[r]egulations promulgated under that section [§ 901(a)] 
forbade aid to educational programs which did not execute an 
“Assurance of Compliance” required by 34 C.F.R. § 106.4 
(1983).  Grove City College [a private college] did not 
discriminate, did not receive any direct federal aid, but [due 
to] religious and other First Amendment protected grounds 
declined to enter into compacts with the government and 
refused to execute the Assurance of Compliance.133   
In the case of colleges and universities, it was common for students to 
receive federal funding to subsidize their tuitions and for student-athletes to 
receive athletic scholarships.  The Court found that such federal monies only 
went to the admissions office—the particular office that received the student 
aid—and not to the college as a whole, for educational services for which the 
monies were remitted.   
This “effectively nullified” Title IX’s application, resulting in 
congressional action to revise the statute, to specifically use a broad-based 
approach.134  Albeit, it took Congress four years to pass the Restoration 
Act,135 which applied not only to Title IX,136 but a number of other federal 
                                                          
132.  465 U.S. 555.  The Court informed that, although the college received no direct federal 
funding, however “Grove City’s students receive BEOG’s [Basic Educational Opportunity Grants] to 
pay for the education they receive at the College.  Their eligibility for assistance is conditioned upon 
continued enrollment at Grove City and on satisfactory progress in their studies.  20 U.S.C. § 
1091(a)(1), (3) (1982 ed.).”  Id. at 566 n.13.  See, e.g., Bennett v. W. Tex. State Univ., 799 F.2d 155, 
158 (5th Cir. 1986) (in this post-Grove City class action case, the Fifth Circuit Court determined 
“[t]his type of ‘trickle down’ benefit is just the type that Grove City explicitly ruled did not trigger 
Title IX coverage.”  It found there was “merely a ministerial relationship between the two programs 
[athletic department and financial aid department], insufficient to bring athletic scholarships under 
Title IX coverage.”  Id. at 159.  The university’s athletic department had received no earmarked 
federal funds. 
133.  DKT Mem’l Fund Ltd. v. Agency for Int’l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 295 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
134.  See Heckman, Scoreboard, supra note 4, at 403.  See also EQUAL PLAY, supra note 41, at 
100.  
In addition to slashing enforcement budgets, President Reagan’s administration attempted 
to squelch Title IX’s broader application with a new limiting interpretation of the law’s 
reach.  Whereas, the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations had all interpreted Title IX 
to prohibit discrimination throughout any institution if it received federal funds, Reagan 
officials wrote the administrative rules so that only the specific program that received the 
federal funds was covered by antidiscrimination laws.   
135.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1687.  For cases examining the Restoration Act’s constitutionality and 
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statutes,137 to legislatively adopt the institution-wide approach.  There has 
been no substantive challenge to the revision, which represents the last change 
to the Title IX statute.  However, because the Restoration Act contained no 
language as to whether it would be retroactively applied, it triggered some 
minimal litigation for those cases on the docket when the change was 
enacted.138 
B.  Roberts’ 2005 Judiciary Committee Confirmation Hearing 
An area of major concern at both the Roberts and Alito hearings, as 
manifested by the commentary and questions posed by the senators on the 
Judiciary Committee concerned the ability of Congress to pass legislation—
presumably, representing the will of the nation (and the legislative role of the 
Senate and House of Representatives)—without it being trampled on by the 
Supreme Court based on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity 
impediments.  No less than three senators on the Committee directed questions 
to Judge Roberts about the Grove City College decision and the subsequent 
Restoration Act.  It must be remembered that the Roberts’ confirmation 
hearing reflected partisan politics, with the Democratic members interrogating 
the nominee while the Republicans were looking to bolster this candidate 
designated by a Republican President.   
1.  Interrogation by Sen. Ted Kennedy 
During the Roberts’ confirmation hearings, Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-
Mass.), whose political legacy focused on the area of civil rights, pointedly 
inquired of then-Judge Roberts about his role regarding the then-Reagan 
Administration’s perception of both the Grove City College decision and 
subsequent Restoration Act.  A problem arises as to the source for purported 
written statements by the nominee, as it was not specifically identified and 
does not appear to be appended within the transcript of the Hearings.  Sen. 
Kennedy provided a succinct review of the Grove City College decision 
[internal footnotes have been added for informational purposes]: 
Senator KENNEDY.  Let me, if I could, go to the Civil Rights 
                                                                                                                                           
retroactive application, see Leake v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 695 F. Supp. 1414 
(E.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d, 869 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1989); Crouteau, 686 F. Supp. 552. 
136.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1687. 
137.  See, e.g., Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2011). 
138.  See, e.g., Leake, , 869 F.2d 130(concluding the Restoration Act would provide retroactive 
application to Rehabilitation Act cases). 
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Restoration Act.139  In 1981, you supported an effort by the 
Department of Education to reverse 17 years of civil rights 
protections at colleges and universities that receive Federal 
funds.140  Under the new regulations, the definition of Federal 
assistance to colleges and universities would be narrowed to 
exclude certain types of students loans and grants so that 
fewer institutions would be covered by the civil rights laws.  
As a result, more colleges and universities would legally be 
able to discriminate against people of color, women, and the 
disabled.141 
Your efforts to narrow the protection of the civil rights laws 
did not stop there, however.  In 1984, in Grove City v. Bell, 
the Supreme Court decided, contrary to the Department of 
Education regulations that you supported, that student loans 
and grants did, indeed, constitute Federal assistance to 
colleges for purposes of triggering civil rights protections. 
But in a surprising twist, the Court concluded that the non-
discrimination laws were intended to apply only to the 
specific program receiving the funds and not to the institution 
as a whole. . . . 
A strong bipartisan majority in both the House and the Senate 
decided to pass another law, the Civil Rights Restoration Act, 
to make it clear that they intended to prohibit discrimination 
in all programs and activities of a university that received 
Federal assistance.  You vehemently opposed the Civil Rights 
Restoration Act.  Even after the Grove City Court found 
otherwise, you still believed that there was—and this is your 
quote—”a good deal of intuitive appeal to the argument that 
Federal loans and grants to students should not be viewed as 
                                                          
139.  20 U.S.C. § 1687, Pub. L. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988). 
140.  The specific statement or memorandum was not identified or supplied in the Hearing 
transcript.  Judge Roberts identified a proposal of U.S. Secretary of Education Terrel H. Bell.  
Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8, at 174–75.  Secretary Bell held the position during the 
first term of the Reagan Administration, from 1981–1984, and was the named defendant in two of the 
major Title IX cases, North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982), and Grove City 
College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984).  In referring to seventeen years, Sen. Kennedy was probably 
referring to the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as with the addition of seventeen 
years, it would come to 1981 (the year of the alleged memorandum, rather than when Title IX was 
enacted, which was in 1972).   
141.  Presumably, referring to other federal statutes. 
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Federal financial assistance to the university.”142  You realize, 
of course, that these loans and grants to the students were paid 
to the university as tuition.  Then even though you 
acknowledged that the program-specific aspect of the 
Supreme Court decision was going to be overturned by the 
congressional legislation, you continued to believe that it 
would be “too onerous” for colleges to comply with 
nondiscrimination laws across the entire university unless it 
was “on the basis of something more solid than Federal aid to 
students.” 
. . . Do you still believe today that it is too onerous for the 
Government to require universities that accept tuition 
payments from students, who rely on Federal grants and loans 
not to discriminate in any of their programs or activities? 
Judge ROBERTS.  No, Senator, and I did not back then.  You 
have not accurately represented my position.  
. . . [Interplay among Sen. Kennedy, Chairman Specter and 
Judge Roberts as to whether Senator Kennedy had given the 
nominee a sufficient opportunity to complete his response.] 
Judge ROBERTS.  Senator, you did not accurately represent 
my position.  The Grove City College case presented two 
separate questions, and it was a matter being litigated, of 
course, in the courts.  The universities were arguing that they 
were not covered at all by the civil rights laws in question 
simply because their students had Federal financial assistance 
and attended their universities.  That was their first argument. 
The second argument was, even if they were covered, all that 
was covered was the admissions office and not other programs 
that themselves did not receive separate financial assistance. 
Our position, the position of the administration—and, again, 
that was the position I was advancing.143  I was not 
formulating policy.  I was articulating and defending the 
administration position.  And the administration’s position 
was, yes, you are covered if the students receive Federal 
                                                          
142.  Again, the specific memorandum was not identified or attached as an exhibit in the official 
transcript released.  See Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8.  This was presumably adopting 
a direct approach, rather than an indirect one, as the money went to students who then gave it to 
universities.  This argument would prove successful in insulating the NCAA in NCAA v. Smith.  525 
U.S. 459 (1999). 
143.  Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8, at 175 (emphasis added). 
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financial assistance, and that the coverage extended to the 
admissions office.  That was the position that the Supreme 
Court agreed with.  We were interpreting legislation.  The 
question is: What is the correct interpretation of the 
legislation?  The position that the administration advanced 
was the one I have just described.  The universities were 
covered due to Federal financial assistance to their students.  
It extended to the admissions office. 
The Supreme Court in the Grove City case agreed with that 
position.  So the position the administration had articulated, 
the Supreme Court concluded, was a correct interpretation of 
what this body, the Congress, had enacted. 
Congress then changed the position about coverage, and that 
position was, I believe, signed into law by the President and 
that became the new law.144  The memo you read about 
[HEW] Secretary Bell’s proposal,145 if I remember it, was, 
well, he said, if we’re going to cover all of the universities, 
then we shouldn’t hinge coverage simply on Federal financial 
assistance.  And the position I took in the memorandum was 
that, no, we should not revisit that question.  We should not 
revisit the question that Federal financial assistance triggers 
coverage. 
Senator KENNEDY.  I have the memo here.146  I have 22 
seconds left.  And your quote is this, “If the entire institution 
is to be covered, however, it should be on the basis of 
something more solid than Federal aid to the students.”  I 
think most of the Members of the Congress feel that if the aid 
to the universities, tuition, loans and grants are going to be 
sufficient to trigger all of the civil rights laws—your 
memorandum here, “If the entire institution is to be covered, 
however, it should be on the basis of something more solid 
than Federal aid to the students.”  That is your memorandum. 
Judge ROBERTS.  Well, Senator, again, the administration 
policy was as I articulated it, and it was my job to articulate 
                                                          
144.  Restoration Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1687, Pub. L. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28.   
145.  Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8, at 175–76 (not supplied).  See supra note 
140 (concerning Sec. Bell). 
146.  Id. 
HECKMAN_FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/2012  1:54 PM 
498 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:2 
the administration policy.147 
After all that exchange, one learned nothing about how the nominee 
viewed the issue contemporaneously, as opposed to his clearly masterful 
ability to volley questions posed at him.  One comment: that Judge Roberts, 
while making it explicit that he was acting in an employer-employee 
relationship, nevertheless used the pronoun “our,” rather than an objective 
description.  Clearly, since Title IX’s enactment in 1972, the tether for the 
statute’s application to eradicate sex discrimination was the provision of 
federal funds to the schools.  Federal funds came directly to colleges in the 
form of revenue for research endeavors and indirectly through federal funds 
provided to collegiate students explicitly to pay tuition costs at the colleges 
and universities, which was a major part of the federal expenditure scheme.  
Any checks issued—either by the federal government or by students for 
tuition—were made payable to the particular college or university and not a 
particular department.  The whole tenet of Title IX was the voluntary 
acquiescence by the recipient to accept the federal funding.  Without access to 
the particular memo, it is difficult to definitely assess if the nominee rejected 
this, instead articulating a rather miserly approach by requiring “something 
more solid” than student federal aid.  For someone so attuned to this issue, to 
be unable to definitely state what happened to the 1988 Restoration Act, which 
occurred during the Reagan Administration, where President Reagan vetoed 
the bill, rather than verbalizing “I believe, signed into law by the President” is 
simply perplexing (even though the nominee had briefly ventured into private 
practice at that juncture (May 1986–Oct. 1989), until being appointed as the 
Principal Deputy Solicitor General in October 1989 during President George 
H.W. Bush’s tenure.  Moreover, the nominee would subsequently argue before 
the Supreme Court in another Title IX case, NCAA v. Smith, which dealt with 
the statutory addition to the law that embodied the directive from the 
Restoration Act, where the nominee, in representing the NCAA, registered 
another cramped but more logical, and successful, interpretation for what 
constituted being a recipient of federal funds.  One could transfer the earlier 
sentiment into an argument that “something more solid” was needed to reign 
in the NCAA from being saddled with Title IX oversight. 
One gets the impression that then Attorney Roberts was a tenacious 
advocate.  What is interesting—aside from his mastery of recall as to the 
intricacies involving cases and matters he worked on twenty years ago—is the 
way he implicitly framed it from an athletic contest point148 in that he won, 
                                                          
147.  Id. at 174–76 (emphasis added). 
148.  Id.  See Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8, at 202, where the nominee opined, 
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that he was, in fact, successful.  Albeit from the Senate testimony, it was his 
nature to be publicly modest about his extraordinary accomplishments rather 
than exhibit a blustery type of approach. 
2.  Inquiry by Sen. Charles E. Grassley 
Sen. Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa) then picked up the baton regarding this 
case, pointing out in that memo ascribed to the nominee: 
Senator GRASSLEY: But Senator Kennedy left out what your 
assessment was on it, and you wrote these words.  “As a 
practical matter, however, I do not think the administration 
can revisit the issue at this late date.”   
Can you tell us what your position was in this memo?  And 
Mr. Chairman, I would like to have this entire memo 
submitted for the record.149 [granted] 
. . . . 
Judge ROBERTS.  The issue was the—in the Grove City case, 
the Court had said that receipt of financial aid by students 
triggered coverage under the civil rights statutes, limited to 
the admissions office, the admission policies.  The Civil 
Rights Restoration Act changed that result to say that the 
limitation was not to the admissions office but applied more 
generally to the institution. 
Secretary [of Education] Bell submitted a proposal.  He said, 
well, if it’s going to apply more generally to the institution, 
then the trigger of simply having students who receive 
financial aid shouldn’t be enough.  And the position that we 
took in response to Secretary Bell’s proposal was no, that we 
weren’t going to revisit it.  We had argued earlier in Grove 
City that financial aid was enough to trigger coverage and we 
weren’t going to revisit that question.  The position was that 
coverage of the entire institution based on receipt of financial 
aid was appropriate.150 
Senator GRASSLEY.  So Senator Kennedy’s words were not 
quoting you but quoting words that Secretary Bell had in this 
                                                                                                                                           
“Well, the Court got it right in each case.” (discussing some other cases). 
149.  Id. at 182.  The memorandum, dated February 12, 1982, was not included as an exhibit in 
the Hearing transcript.   
150.  Id.  It was the holding of the Court regardless of whether it was appropriate or not. 
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memo, and you were reacting to those. 
Judge ROBERTS.  Well, it’s, again, 23-some years ago.  But 
my recollection is that that was his proposal.  Our response 
was that, no, we’re not going to do that, we’re not going to 
change the position we’ve taken in light of the new 
legislation. 
[Senator Grassley then went into a discussion of the Voting 
Rights Act.]151 
What about inquiring what the candidate’s current position was, as of 
2005?  Not surprisingly, the jurist again recited the issues that were confronted 
in the case—as he had for Sen. Kennedy. 
3.  Exchange with Sen. Joseph Biden 
But that was not the end of the discussion.  There was a bit of partisanship 
between both sides of the aisle.  Sen. Joseph Biden, Jr. (D-Del.) also dived into 
the pool with some preliminaries, followed by this exchange: 
Senator BIDEN.  The date of the memo was February 12, 
1982.  I will give you a copy, ask them to bring you down a 
copy of the memo. 
Judge ROBERTS.  I can’t elaborate on—I can’t elaborate 
beyond what’s in the memo.  I just— 
Senator BIDEN.  Well, I hope you don’t still hold that view, 
man.  I mean, if the idea that you’re not going to—that a 
conservative civil rights—the head of the Civil Rights 
Division in the Reagan administration says it is pretty clear 
Kentucky is discriminating against women in their prison 
system,152 and you say, in effect, that may be but, look, we 
shouldn’t move on it, I recommend we don’t do anything 
about this, and the reason we shouldn’t do anything [about] 
this is three-fold: one, private citizens already went ahead and 
filed suit on this; number two, if, in fact, you go ahead and do 
this, they may do away with the system [educational programs 
provided to male prisoners] for the men because there’s [sic] 
tight budgets—and I forget the third one.  You now have the 
memo. 
                                                          
151.  Id. at 182–83. 
152.  See, e.g., Archer v. Reno, 877 F. Supp. 372 (E.D. Ky. 1995). 
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Judge ROBERTS.  Well, I have the memo and see that one of 
the areas that you mentioned I say that—and this is to the 
Attorney General, and I say the reason we shouldn’t do this is 
because “you have publicly opposed such approaches.”  So, 
again, it would have been— 
Senator BIDEN.  It was only his idea, then?  I mean, you were 
just protecting him so he wouldn’t be inconsistent? 
Judge ROBERTS.  I was a lawyer on his staff, and according 
to this memorandum—and, again, 
I don’t remember anything independently of this 23 years ago.  
But the memorandum suggests, a staff lawyer to his boss, that 
this is inconsistent with what you have said.  And, again, I 
guess I would regard that as good staff work rather than 
anything else. 
Senator BIDEN.  I regard it as very poor staff work, with all 
due respect, Judge, because it seems to me you insert your 
views very strongly in here.  You don’t say you said this.  You 
say, “And, by the way, there’s [sic] other reasons why we 
shouldn’t do this.  Assume you’re saying you wouldn’t go this 
route before, but I want to give you more ammunition here, 
Brad.153  Private plaintiffs have done this; it is inconsistent 
with three themes in your judicial restraints effort: equal 
protection claim, relief of a well-involved judicial inference, 
et cetera; and, by the way, the end result may be with tight 
budgets they may do away with this.” 
My time is running out.  I will come back to this.  I hope you 
get a chance to study it between now and the time we get back 
                                                          
153.  The transcript did not specify a complete name for this individual.  However, the Assistant 
Attorney General of the Civil Rights Division at the U.S. Justice Department during most of the 
Reagan Administration was William Bradford Reynolds.   
There was a memorandum from Mr. Roberts to “Brad Reynolds.”  See National Archives News, 
Records Pertaining to John G. Roberts, Jr. (Released on Sept. 2, 2005) (Files concerning William 
Bradford Reynolds from 1981-1988) (Memorandum from John Roberts to Brad Reynolds, AAG Civil 
Rights Division; Voting Rights Act; Internal Memos (Feb. 8, 1982) (Box # 14; Folder # 387), 
available at http://www.archives.gov/news/john-roberts/accession-60-89-0172/001-Box14-
Folder387.pdf; University of California at Santa Barbara, Radio Address to the Nation on Civil Rights 
(June 15, 1985), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=38782#axzz1r 
YVMVjoy (wherein President Reagan referred to “Brad Reynolds.”   (Parenthetically, Judge Roberts 
was appointed as Special Assistant by Hon. W. French Smith.  Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra 
note 8, at 69.  During the two-term Reagan Administration (Jan. 1981–Jan. 1989), Smith was 
succeeded by Hon. Edwin Meese III, in 1985, who was succeeded by Hon. Richard L. Thornburgh, 
U.S. Attorney General, during the George H.W. Bush Administration.). 
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to the second round.154 
Sen. Biden would nevertheless continue exploring this area with Judge 
Roberts. 
Senator BIDEN.  The next question.  You know, I find it 
fascinating, this whole thing about Title IX and whether or not 
by Title IX—you and I know what we are talking about, but 
for the public at large who really has an interest in all of this 
as well, the issue was whether or not when a student gets aid, 
whether or not it only goes to the admissions piece of it. 
Now, you said something that was accurate but I don’t think 
fulsome to Senator Kennedy, and correct me if I am wrong.  
You said, look, we were arguing that it did apply—Title IX 
did apply.  If a student got aid, it applied to the university.  
That was one of the questions, whether or not you have no 
application or a narrow application [to the educational 
institution].  And you argued that it should apply to the 
admissions process. 
But there is a second issue in that case, and the second issue 
is: Do you apply it narrowly only to do with the admissions 
policy or do you apply it to if they are discriminating in 
dormitories?155 
I got your answer on the first part.  You thought it should 
apply, at least narrowly.  Were you arguing that it should 
apply broadly?  And this was before—let me make it clear.  
The district court, I say to my friends—because I had 
forgotten this.  The district court had ruled that this only 
applies to admissions, and there was a question.  The 
Chairman of Reagan’s Commission on Civil Rights said we 
should get in on the side of the plaintiff here, and we should 
appeal this to the Supreme Court or to a higher court and say, 
“No, no, this applies across the board, this applies if you don’t 
put money in sports programs, you don’t put money in 
dormitories, et cetera.” 
What was your position on Reagan’s Civil Rights Chairman, 
Clarence Pendleton, suggesting that we appeal the decision of 
                                                          
154.  Roberts’ Confirmation Hearings, supra note 8, at 192–93. 
155.  Presumably, referring to a program-wide analysis. 
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the circuit court narrowly applying it only to the admissions 
office? 
Judge ROBERTS.  Senator, I was a staff lawyer.  I didn’t have 
a position.  The administration had a position, and the 
administration’s position was the two-fold position you’ve set 
forth.  First, Title IX applies.  Second, it applies to the office, 
the admissions office. 
[Some interchange as to the answers supplied.] . . . . 
Judge ROBERTS.  –dispute that was 20-some years ago.  The 
effort was to interpret what this body, Congress, meant.  The 
administration position was Federal financial aid triggers 
coverage.  It’s limited to the admissions office.  The United 
States Supreme Court agreed on both counts. 
Senator BIDEN.  I understand that. 
Judge ROBERTS.  So I would say that the administration 
correctly interpreted the intent of Congress in enacting that 
legislation. 
Senator BIDEN.  Well, let me read what you wrote in that 
memo.  You said you “strongly agree.”  Now, when my staff 
sends me a memo saying, “Senator, I recommend you do the 
following . . . and I strongly agree,” that usually is a pretty 
good indication what they think.  Now, maybe they don’t.  
Maybe they just like to use the word “strongly.”  They said 
“strongly agree.”  It usually means they agree.  Number one. 
Number two, you went on to say, and I quote, that if you have 
the broad interpretation, it will be—the Federal Government 
will be rummaging “willy-nilly through institutions.”  So you 
expressed not only that you strongly agree, but you thought 
that if you gave them this power to broadly interpret it, to 
apply to dormitories and all these other things, that they would 
willy-nilly—they would rummage willy-nilly through 
institutions. 
It seems to me you had a pretty strong view back then.  
Maybe you don’t have it now. 
Judge ROBERTS.  Well, and the Supreme Court’s conclusion 
was that that the administration position was a correct reading 
of the law that this body passed.  So if the view was strongly 
held, it was because I thought that was a correct reading of 
the law.  The Supreme Court concluded that it was a correct 
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reading of the law.156 
It is unknown why the document or documents were not initially provided 
to the witness.  The Chairman, a former trial attorney, should have required 
that the witness be provided with any written memoranda discussed by the 
senators.  All this sturm und drang about events two decades ago.  Sen. Biden 
was attempting to elicit—albeit in his ubiquitous style157—Judge Roberts’ 
current sentiments.  The part of “being able to do away with this” through 
“tight budgets” was the most disturbing.  It embodies a win at any cost 
mentality.  In other words, while a law may be on the books, if there is no 
money to enforce the law, it is essentially toothless and thus de facto non-
existent.  For example, if there are insufficient inspectors to inspect whether 
meat from cows complies with U.S. Department of Agriculture standards, then 
the regulations become de facto meaningless.  Or, from a Title IX perspective, 
if there is not sufficient money appropriated to the OCR, then it puts a strain 
on administrative enforcement of the statute by the executive department and 
specifically the U.S. Department of Education. 
Remarkably, the Title IX matter would not rest.  On September 14, 2005, 
during the second day of questioning, Sen. Orren Hatch (R-Utah), a former 
chair of the Judiciary Committee, would afford the witness an opportunity to 
redress apparent criticism of his Title IX colloquy during the previous day: 
Senator HATCH.  Now, also yesterday the Democratic staff 
of the Committee released a press release stating that you 
failed to distance yourself from what it called your “earlier 
cramped positions on Title IX and women’s rights.” . . . Now, 
what assurance can you give the Committee that you will 
fairly interpret the civil rights laws, including critical statutes 
such as Title IX, fully and fairly, consistent with the purposes 
Congress intended in passing these laws? 
Judge ROBERTS.  [essentially repeated what he had said in 
his opening statement including that “I have no agenda,” and 
distinguishing that his role as a judge differed from the role of 
a “staff lawyer.”]  I am now a judge, and I have had the 
experience and I think my record will establish that that is 
how I approach cases across the spectrum of issues that are 
                                                          
156.  Id. at 193–94 (emphasis added). 
157.  Mark Leibovich, Speaking Freely, Sometimes, Biden Finds Influential Role, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 29, 2009, at 1, 16. (indicating that “they also acknowledge that the verbose vice president has 
struggled to adjust at times to working within a White House that prizes discipline.”).  As of March 
2012, Vice President Biden has maintained a relatively low profile during the current administration. 
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raised before the courts.158 
From a semantics viewpoint, it could be argued that the term “cramped” 
was a rather surprisingly bland word used for partisan politics, here adopted by 
the Democratic Party to describe the judge’s unflinching and static verbiage.  
Was that the best term the Democrats could muster?  It hardly seemed 
worthwhile to even call attention to the statement and bring it up.  Again, the 
witness deftly slid a fastball across the home plate without straining or getting 
any dirt on his uniform.  He kept to the mantra.  The entire answer, such as it 
was, voiced absolutely no mention of the words “Title IX” or “gender 
discrimination.”  Sen. Hatch continued with his questioning reminding the 
audience that Attorney Roberts had ultimately advocated the correct position 
in Grove City College. 
Senator HATCH.  So I find it strange to criticize you because 
you won a case in the Supreme Court and have not advocated 
against women’s rights in any way, shape, or form ever in 
your career, as far as I can understand.  Is that correct? 
Judge ROBERTS.  That’s correct, Senator. 
Senator HATCH.  And, in fact, you are a strong supporter of 
women’s rights and gender equality? 
Judge ROBERTS.  Yes, Senator.159 
It would have been interesting if there was an amplification by the 
nominee on this particular area of support of women’s rights.  No Democratic 
senator picked up on this exchange to seek examples. 
4.  Alito’s Judiciary Committee Confirmation Hearing 
The Senate hearings for his colleague, then Judge Samuel A. Alito, did not 
explicitly focus on Title IX jurisprudence.  However, Judge Alito had the 
following general exchange during his Senate Judiciary Confirmation hearing, 
which implicitly referred to Title IX [internal footnotes have been added for 
informational purposes]: 
Senator [Russell] FEINGOLD [D-Wis.].  Thank you, Judge.  
                                                          
158.  Roberts’ Confirmation Hearings, supra note 8, at 310–11 (emphasis added).  See supra text 
accompanying notes 75–76 (Judge Roberts’ opening remarks). 
159.  Id.  Sen. Coburn (R-Okla.)would mention Title IX and a pre-Grove City case, University of 
Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 1982) (utilizing a narrow approach), to also allude to 
the witness supporting women’s rights.  Id. at 399–400. 
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Does Congress have the authority to enact legislation that 
would protect gay students from harassment in schools that 
receive Federal funding? 
Judge ALITO.  That would fall within the South Dakota v. 
Dole160 standard, and the question would be whether the 
condition that’s attached to the receipt of the Federal funds is 
germane to the purpose of the funding, and that’s a standard 
that gives Congress a very broad authority. 
Senator FEINGOLD.  So that Congress does have the 
authority in general.  The question would be the scope of it. 
Judge ALITO.  Congress has the authority to attach all sorts 
of conditions to the receipt of Federal money.  It has to be 
clear so that the States understand what they’re getting into, 
that if you take this money there are conditions that go with it, 
but provided that that clear statement requirement is satisfied 
and provided that the condition is germane to the purpose of 
the funding, then Congress can attach conditions, and it could 
do so in this area.161 
Judge Alito did not identify either of the Title IX Supreme Court decisions 
rendered in Gebser or Davis, which pertained to sexual harassment generally.  
The discussion becomes significant due to the Rehnquist Court’s interpretation 
of the extent of the Eleventh Amendment’s application, requiring that there be 
an appropriate Fourteenth Amendment section five nexus to uphold the ability 
                                                          
160.  483 U.S. 203 (1987) (sanctioning Congress’ imposition of a minimum drinking age of 21 in 
connection with the distribution of federal highway funds, 23 U.S.C. § 158, as a valid use of 
Congress’ Spending Powers, pursuant to the U.S. Constitution.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.).  See 
Justice Alito’s decision in Arlington Central School District Bd. of Education  v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 
291, 296 (2006) (discussion of the Spending Clause with the Individuals with Disabilities in 
Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400, as reauthorized by Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004), case addressing whether 
compensation should be afforded expert witnesses), wherein the jurist almost reiterated verbatim his 
Senate Judiciary Committee response, stating: 
Congress has broad power to set the terms on which it disburses federal money to the 
States, . . . but when Congress attaches conditions to a State’s acceptance of federal funds, 
the conditions must be set out “unambiguously.”  “[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the 
spending power [of the U.S. Constitution] is much in the nature of a contract,” and 
therefore, to be bound by “federally imposed conditions,” recipients of federal funds must 
accept them “voluntarily and knowingly.”  States cannot knowingly accept conditions of 
which they are “unaware” or which they are “unable to ascertain.” 
Id. at 296 (citations omitted) (referred to in Thro, supra note 30, at 497).   
161.  Alito’s Confirmation Hearing, supra note 20, at 621.   
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of federal legislation to allow citizens to sue state entities in federal courts – 
and can arise where there is a federal-funding aspect to a federal statute (such 
as with Title IX). 
Judge Alito commented generally about discrimination, “‘[w]hen I get a 
case about discrimination, I have to think about people in my own family who 
suffered discrimination because of their ethnic background or because of 
religion or because of gender.  And I do take that into account.’”162  Albeit, 
one commentator stressed this Justice’s empathy was constrained, “[i]n 
general, Alito has been no more likely to uphold civil rights claims than 
Roberts, and only somewhat more likely than Scalia and Thomas.”163 
V.  OVERSIGHT OVER ATHLETIC ASSOCIATIONS: STRIKE THREE 
“Generally, athletic associations have been buffered from Title IX 
jurisdiction, as the associations did not directly receive federal funds.”164  In 
NCAA v. Smith,165 the Supreme Court unanimously concluded that the NCAA 
was not a recipient of federal funds to bring it within Title IX jurisdiction 
simply because its member schools received federal funds.  As indicated, 
Attorney Roberts successfully represented the NCAA in the appeal before the 
Court.  According to written testimony provided by then-Judge Roberts at his 
Senate Judiciary Committee nomination hearings, as to his role in representing 
the NCAA concerning its seeking a writ of certiorari by the Supreme Court 
and then upon its grant of the actual appeal, he wrote: 
The issue on the merits was what it meant to “receiv[e] 
Federal financial assistance,” under the terms of the statute.  
On behalf of the NCAA, we argued that according to Supreme 
                                                          
162.  Emily Bazelon, Mysterious Justice: What Drives Samuel Alito, Anyway?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
20, 2011, § 6 (Magazine), at 14 (referring to his 2006 confirmation hearings).  This author opined, 
“By operating one case at a time, rather than from a grand vision, Alito has proved himself to be the 
closest thing conservatives have to a feeling justice.”  Id. at 13.  The article found that: 
Alito’s sense of empathy . . . rarely extends to people who are not like him.  Alito [who 
authored the majority decision] had no kind words for Lilly Ledbetter, for example, who 
for almost 20 years was paid less than the men doing the same job she held as a 
supervisor at Goodyear Tire and Rubber.  In 2007, he wrote the 5–4 decision turning 
away Ledbetter’s sex-discrimination suit because she didn’t go to court soon enough; she 
didn’t know about the pay discrepancy until years later. 
Id. at 14 (referring to Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (addressing 
Title VII litigation)). 
163.  Id.  
164.  Heckman, The Glass Sneaker, supra note 4, at 570 n.82.  
165.  Smith, 525 U.S. 459. 
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Court precedent, coverage under the statute is limited to direct 
recipients of federal funding—those who knowingly entered 
into a bargain by accepting the funding.  In a unanimous 
opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court 
agreed with this position and reversed the Third Circuit.166 
Judge Roberts amplified: 
We argued in our briefs that the Supreme Court had 
developed a contract theory of coverage with respect to 
legislation, such as Title IX, enacted pursuant to Congress’ 
Spending Clause powers.  Under that theory, entities that 
knowingly and voluntarily accept federal funding are subject 
to the restrictions that come with it.  The necessary 
implication of this theory is that coverage under the statute is 
limited to direct recipients of the funding – those who 
knowingly entered into a bargain by accepting the funding – 
and does not “follow [] the aid past the recipient to those who 
merely benefit from the aid.”167  
As Judge Roberts noted, “[t]he Court explained that, at most, the NCAA’s 
‘receipt of dues demonstrates that it indirectly benefits from the federal 
assistance afforded its members.  This showing, without more, is insufficient 
to trigger Title IX coverage.’”168  The Supreme Court would agree with his 
position.  The hearings contained no discourse as to role of Attorney Roberts 
representing the NCAA and the effect of this decision on female student-
athletes subject to the rules and regulations of the most important athletic 
association nationally. 
During the confirmation hearings, Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.) had 
inquired about the Spending Clause: 
Senator FEINSTEIN.  Well, let me ask you.  Do you believe 
that State obligations created by Congress through the 
Spending Clause are enforceable by citizens in the courts? 
Judge ROBERTS.  Well, the answer there is it depends on that 
law.  In Gonzaga what the Court determined was that [the] 
provision at issue there was not enforceable by private citizens 
                                                          
166.  Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8, at 78 (written response). 
167.  Id. at 105. 
168.  Id. (citing Smith, 525 U.S. at 468). 
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in the courts.  It was enforceable by the Federal Government.  
The Federal Government can cut off the funds.  More likely, 
the Federal Government can enforce the provision through 
proceedings against the university. 
In the Wilder case, a different statute, the Court determined 
the condition in that case, the Medicare—or Medicaid funding 
case was enforceable, a private citizen could go into court 
because the review of Congress’ intent in that case came out 
differently than it did in the Gonzaga case. 
Senator FEINSTEIN.  Thank you.  Well, let me just finish this 
quickly.  I am not a lawyer and I don’t really know how to ask 
this question, but let me try.  When is it a contract and when is 
it the law?  Because if it is a contract, that affects a whole host 
of laws that we pass that are very important—Medicaid, Title 
IX, No Child Left Behind, even the Internet Protection Act, all 
of these things.  So when does a contract attach? 
 Judge ROBERTS.  It’s always a contract, and sometimes if 
the intent of Congress is that private parties be allowed to sue, 
it’s more than a contract.  But it’s always at least a contract. 
Senator FEINSTEIN.  So the intent has to be a specific intent. 
 Judge ROBERTS.  It doesn’t—no, the courts don’t require 
that.  They don’t require that you specifically say you have the 
right to sue.  But the Court has to look at it and try to figure 
out did you intend—when you put this provision in, did you 
intend private parties to be able to sue for damages? Or did 
you expect the Department of Education to enforce that and 
have the authority to cut off the funds or to impose other 
conditions because a university is violating it?  And as I’ve 
said, some cases come out one way, and some cases come out 
the other way.  But in each of those cases, what the Court is 
trying to do is figure out what you, the Congress, meant in 
that statute.169  
                                                          
169.  Roberts’ Confirmation Hearing, supra note 8, at 430 (emphasis added) (referring to 
Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) (addressing the Family Educational Rights and 
Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232 (2000) [hereinafter FERPA] (providing confidentiality as to certain 
school records) (finding there was no § 1983 private right of action for students to claim violation of 
the FERPA statute; thus, it would be up to the Department of Education to ameliorate any 
violations)).  Presumably, the second case being referred to was Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass’n, 
496 U.S. 498 (1990) (also involving the Spending Clause and a challenge to the Medicaid Act 
program).  See Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 280 (citing Wilder, 496 U.S. 498 (1990)).   
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Too bad none of the senators inquired as to whether the jurist also 
supported the Court’s decision in Cannon, allowing a citizen to go forward to 
safeguard his or her Title IX rights, rather than having to rely solely on the 
Department of Education, which due to policy or monetary reasons, could be 
restricted in its enforcement of the statute.   
Near the end of the questioning of the witness, there was an exchange 
among Sen. Charles Schumer (D-NY), Sen. Feinstein, Chairman Spector and 
Judge Roberts, precipitated by Sen. Schumer’s inquiry as to what type of 
judge the witness would be if elevated to the highest court. 
Senator SCHUMER.  . . . Will you be a truly modest, 
temperate, careful judge in the tradition of Harlan, Jackson, 
Frankfurter and Friendly?  Will you be a very conservative 
judge who will impede congressional prerogatives but who 
does not use the bench to remake society like Justice 
Rehnquist?  Or will you use your enormous talents to use the 
Court to turn back a near century of progress and create the 
majority that Justices Scalia and Thomas could not achieve?  
This is the question that we on the Committee will have to 
grapple with this week. . . . 
 Judge ROBERTS.  . . . And, Senator Schumer, I don’t think 
you can read those [50 Circuit Court] opinions and say that 
these are the opinions of an ideologue.  You may think they’re 
not enough.  You may think you need more of a sample.  That 
is your judgment.  But I think if you’ve looked at what I’ve 
done since I took the judicial oath, that should convince you 
that I’m not an ideologue, and you and I agree that that’s not 
the sort of person we want on the Supreme Court.170 
 
VI.  POSTSCRIPT 
On January 21, 2009, in Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, the 
Roberts Court rendered its first Title IX-related opinion, concluding that the 
                                                          
170.  Id. at 442–43.  See Linda Greenhouse, Roberts Is at Court’s Helm, But He Isn’t Yet in 
Control, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2006, at 2, 22–23.  
His goal of inspiring the court to speak softly and unanimously seemed a distant 
aspiration as important cases failed to produce majority opinions and members of the 
court, including occasionally the chief justice himself, gave voice to their frustration and 
pique with colleagues who did not see things their way. 
Id. at 2. 
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Title IX statute does not preempt § 1983 claims171 based on the Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection Clause.172  The case concerned peer sexual 
harassment alleged by a female kindergarten student against the Massachusetts 
public school she attended based on the actions of a male third-grade student 
that purportedly occurred on a frequent basis on a school bus over a number of 
months.  The student’s parents, who were dissatisfied with the public school’s 
proposed solutions to the situation, instituted suit against the school committee 
responsible for the public school based on Title IX and also sought relief based 
on the Fourteenth Amendment through use of § 1983.  Rather than Chief 
Justice Roberts electing to write this opinion, he instead passed the assignment 
to Justice O’Connor’s successor, Justice Alito.  The Court delivered a 
unanimous opinion.173  The previous day, Sen. Biden was sworn in as Vice 
President of the United States.174  On March 23, 2009, the Court declined to 
hear the appeal in Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Education,175 
concerning whether the elimination of intercollegiate teams at James Madison 
University, a NCAA Division I college, violated Title IX.   
During May 2009, Justice Souter announced his intention to retire from 
the Court upon the induction of a successor.176  Later that year, Congress 
approved President Barack Obama’s first nominee to the Supreme Court, 
Circuit Court Judge Sonia Sotomayor, a member of the Second Circuit Court 
and the first Latina-American.  Her Senate confirmation hearings focused on 
other topics.  Justice Sotomayor has not presently participated in any Title IX 
cases.  During April 2010, Justice Stevens, the Court’s oldest jurist, made 
public his intention to retire at the end of the 2009–2010 term (which ended on 
June 28, 2010).  President Obama nominated U.S. Solicitor General Elena 
Kagan.177  Her Senate confirmation hearing took up four days commencing on 
                                                          
171.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2011) (Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights). 
172.  Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm. 555 U.S. 246 (2009).  See Diane Heckman, Fitzgerald 
v. Barnstable School Committee: The Supreme Court and the Axis of Section 1983, Title IX and the 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause in Seeking Redress of Education-Related Sexual 
Harassment, 246 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Heckman, Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School 
Committee] (examining, in detail, this case and the surrounding legal issues). 
173.  See Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. 246. 
174.  See Zeleny, supra note 71. 
175.  291 F. App’x 517 (4th Cir. 2008) (unpublished opinion), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1127 
(2009). 
176.  See Editorial, Justice Souter Departs, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2009, § 4 (week in review), at 9 
(stating, “Abiding commitment to core constitutional values is precisely what Justice Souter . . . has 
demonstrated in his 18 years on the court.”  The editorial also underscored, “Justice Souter went on to 
become a reliable champion of civil rights.”  Id.). 
177.  President Clinton had previously nominated Ms. Kagan, another Harvard Law School 
graduate, who was involved as a counsel with his White House, to a federal judge position, but the 
congressional confirmation hearings were never scheduled.  The first two days of the Senate Judiciary 
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June 28, 2010.  The lackluster hearings, based on inquires posed, concerned no 
questions directed toward Title IX.  The Senate Judiciary Committee voted 
favorably on Solicitor General Kagan’s nomination, and she was sworn in as 
the Court’s fourth female Justice on August 7, 2010.  One commentator 
opined that Justices Sotomayor and Kagan “have quickly become a formidable 
duo on the court’s left flank, with the promise to serve as a 21st-century 
version of Thurgood Marshall and William Brennan.”178  The 2010–2011 term 
marked the fifth term of the Roberts Court, deemed the most conservative 
court in decades,179 with “[f]our of the six most conservative justices of the 44 
who have sat on the court since 1937 . . . serving now: Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justices Alito, Antonin Scalia and, most conservative of all, Clarence 
Thomas.”180 
On the legislative side, as indicated, Sen. Biden became Vice President of 
the United States.  Sen. Kennedy died during August 2009.181  Sen. Spector, 
Chairman of the Judiciary Committee from 2005–2007, changed his long-
standing party affiliation (from Republican to Democrat), in 2009, and then 
lost a primary race that year to seek re-election for his Senate seat in 
Pennsylvania.  Sen. Feingold lost his 2010 campaign for re-election.  Sen. 
Brownback left the U.S. Senate in 2011 to become the Governor of Kansas. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Forty years of Title IX jurisprudence before the Supreme Court has 
centered on threshold and jurisdictional issues as to whether individuals can 
pursue routine discriminatory claims against certain entities (Cannon, North 
                                                                                                                                           
Committee hearings (June 28–29, 2010) were not directed to any specific discussion of Title IX.  The 
Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010). 
178.  Emily Bazelon, Chamber of Pain: The Next Few Years of Supreme Court Rulings Could Be 
Brutal for Liberals, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2011, § 6 (Magazine), at 9 [hereinafter Bazelon, Chamber of 
Pain]. 
179.  Liptak, The Most Conservative Court in Decades, supra note 21, at 1.  See also Jeff Shesol, 
Evolving Circumstances, Enduring Value, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2010, at 14 (regarding STEPHEN 
BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK:  A JUDGE’S VIEW (2010)), stating  
[B]reyer and the court’s liberals . . . are up against the most assertive and, let’s just admit 
it, activist bloc of conservatives in modern memory.  According to a recent analysis, even 
the right-leaning justices of the 1930s – the ‘Four Hourseman’ who tried to derail the New 
Deal – are moderates, when compared with John Roberts, Samuel Alito et al. 
180.  Liptak, The Most Conservative Court in Decades, supra note 21, at 18.  See also Bazelon, 
Chamber of Pain, supra note 178, at 9 (“And with the left already outnumbered five to four on the 
Roberts court, liberals are feeling no small amount of trepidation heading into this period, as if the 
basic tenets of compassionate governance could be brought low.”).   
181.  See EDWARD M. KENNEDY, TRUE COMPASS (2009) (memoir). 
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Haven, Grove City College and Smith) or claims involving sexual harassment 
(Gebser and Davis), or retaliation (Jackson) and if so, can compensatory 
damages be awarded (Franklin).  It is somewhat fitting that Justice O’Connor, 
the first female member of this august group, is the jurist to author the most 
Title IX Supreme Court opinions.  A review of the last four pre-Roberts Court 
decisions demonstrated the strong block (Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice 
Scalia, Justice Thomas and Justice Kennedy) in the cases of Gebser, Davis, 
Smith and Jackson, to restrict or temper Title IX’s applicability—even where 
causes of action were allowed to proceed.  With the departure of Justice 
O’Connor, a tempered judicial supporter of the statute, albeit with tough 
parameters, and the death of Chief Justice Rehnquist, a non-supporter of broad 
application to Title IX, it now awaits the tenure of the two new men and two 
new women on the bench.182  The hearings for Justice Alito were devoid of a 
substantive discussion of Title IX, and he had not participated in any of the 
underlying intermediate appellate court reviews for Title IX cases that 
marched through the Third Circuit Court (Grove City College and Smith).  
Likewise, the hearings for Justices Sotomayor and Kagan were not predicated 
upon discussions of Title IX.183 
During September 2005, Judge Roberts, with all his intellectual acumen, 
was still regurgitating backpay remedies for students pursuant to Title IX—
despite the Court explicitly rejecting this argument—without any internal 
reconfiguring or recalibration as a result of the Franklin opinion.  The then-
fifty-year-old jurist could not recall the exact trajectory of the Restoration Act 
and could not identify the exact standard used for Fourteenth Amendment 
Equal Protection Clause second-tier sex discrimination claims, while he knew 
the standards for the first and third tier ones.  His unequivocal strong advocacy 
against Title IX as a government and private attorney can be added to the 
equation.  Even the Solicitor General for the George W. Bush administration 
supported the plaintiff’s position in Jackson184 that Title IX allowed for a 
retaliation cause of action for the coach when he was speaking out for 
purported lack of gender equity for his student-athletes.  To use the baseball 
metaphor, if Judge Roberts was the pitcher and Title IX the hitter, based on 
what occurred during his nomination hearings pertaining to his litigation 
career, Title IX struck out swinging on three pitches.  With the addition of the 
                                                          
182.  See generally Linda Greenhouse, The Roberts Court, Version 4.0, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 
2010, § 4 (week in review), at 10. 
183.  See Mark Walsh, Supreme Court Nominee Elena Kagan Has Sparse Record on Education, 
NSBA LEGAL CLIPS (May 20, 2010), http://legalclips.nsba.org/?m=2010&w=20. 
184.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Jackson v. Birmingham 
Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (No. 02-1672), 2004 WL 1900496.  See Heckman, Deconstructing 
Title IX Sexual Harassment, supra note 47, at 22. 
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Court’s new Chief Umpire, certainly not inclined to like anything about the 
statute based on his fossilized congressional testimony evidencing his thoughts 
about his actions as an attorney, it will be interesting to see what occurs in the 
future.  When the next Title IX case comes before the Court, rather than the 
customary opening words “Oyez, Oyez, Oyez,” the session will start with 
“Batter up,” and sitting behind the bench will be the Chief                      
Umpire.  Time will tell what the dimensions of the batter’s box are for the 
Title IX players in the Roberts Court.185 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
185.  See supra text accompanying note 171.  Presently, the Roberts Court did not grant any 
petitions for writs of certiorari to address Title IX during his inaugural term (2005–2006), and the first 
full term without Justice O’Connor (2006–2007).  During the next term (2007–2008), the Court 
agreed to hear the appeal in the Title IX-related case Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, and 
on January 21, 2009, the Court issued its decision.  Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. 246 (unanimously ruling that 
Title IX did not preempt a Section 1983 Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause claim, 
finding the statute was not comprehensive).  See Heckman, Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School 
Committee, supra note 172.  See also Equity in Athletics, 291 F. App’x 517 cert. denied, 556 U.S. 
1127 (2009) .  There were no other grants of certiorari involving Title IX cases during the 2010–2011 
term. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE 1.  Summary of Pre-Roberts Court’s Title IX Decisions 
 
  Name of Case Decision Author Subject Matter    
1 
Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago,  
411 U.S. 677 (1979)              
(reversing and remanding Seventh 
Circuit) 
(7–2) Stevens 
affording a private right of action 
(student) generally to remedy 
Title IX violations 
2 
North Haven Sch. Bd. v. Bell, 
 456 U.S. 512 (1982)         
(affirming and remanding Third Circuit) 
(6–3) Blackmun 
upholding the constitutionality of 
the Title IX regulations (Subpart 
E\) governing employment 
3 
Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 
456 U.S. 555 (1984)     
(affirming Third Circuit) 
(7–2) White 
narrow interpretation as to the 
receipt of federal funds element  
4 
Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Public Schs., 
503 U.S. 60 (1984) (9-0) 186  
(reversing Eleventh Circuit) 
(9–0) White 
allowing monetary damages as a 
remedy for intentional violation 
of the statute 
5 
Gebser v. Lago Indep. Vista Sch. Dist., 
524 U.S. 274 (1998) (affirming Fifth 
Circuit) 
(5–4) O'Connor 
affording a cause of action 
against educational institutions 
based on teacher-student sexual 
harassment 
6 
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Smith, 
525 U.S. 459 (1999)   
(vacating and remanding Third Circuit) 
(9–0) Ginsburg 
indirect receipt of federal funds 
by an entity is not sufficient to 
render Title IX jurisdiction 
7 
Davis v. Monroe County Bd. Of Educ., 
526 U.S. 629 (1999) 
(reversing and remanding Eleventh 
Circuit) 
(5–4) O'Connor 
affording a peer sexual 
harassment cause of action 
against the educational institution 
8 
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 
544 U.S. 167 (2005)  
(reversing Eleventh Circuit) 
(5–4) O'Connor 
affording educational employees 
a retaliation cause of action 
                                                          
186.   Although this was a unanimous decision, Justice Scalia authored a concurring opinion 
reluctantly agreeing with the judgment, joined in by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas.  A 
certain pattern emerged, as Chief Justice Rehnquist, along with Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy 
and Thomas, formed the stalwart block in four subsequent Franklin cases limiting or restricting Title 
IX, even though they were in the majority position.  See Gebser, 524 U.S. 274; NCAA v. Smith, 525 
U.S. 459; Davis, 526 U.S. 629; Jackson, 544 U.S. 167. 
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